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One of the great urban legends on the Internet was "Bill 6o2P."' In
the late 199OS it spread like wildfire, and it occasionally makes the rounds
again like pleas from Nigerian officials seeking help with their Swiss
bank accounts or the story of the $250 Neiman Marcus cookie recipe.
The bill, supported by (no doubt soon-to-be-defeated) "Congressman
Tony Schnell," would have imposed a five cent tax on each e-mail
message. One would be hard put to imagine a more nefarious way for
* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. Many people read all or large parts
of this Article and provided helpful suggestions. Ann Althouse, Vince Blasi, N.D. Chang, Orin Kerr,
Marty Redish, David Schwartz, Linda Smith, and Dan Solove all read and improved the piece. I am
particularly indebted to Dan, who suggested a structural change that has made the piece far clearer
than it was in its original form. This Article is part of a larger project that I presented at the 2006
Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum, and I am grateful for comments I received from Jack Balkin and
other participants there. Historians Richard R. John, Richard Kielbowicz, and Bill Merkel all were
indispensable in ensuring historical accuracy (though I take responsibility for any errors on that
count). Conversations with Rich Leffler at the Ratification of the Constitution Project also shaped my
thinking about some of the historical background. Sarah Maguire and Keli Rylance provided superb
research assistance, and the helpful staff at the University of Wisconsin Law Library, including Bill
Ebbott, Mike Morgalla, and student intern Tara Boyer helped track down a multitude of sources.
Theresa Dougherty, Mike Dudchek, Melissa Leets, Melissa Melshenker, Sue Sawatske, and Elise
Volkmann all helped with word-processing and editing. Finally, I am grateful for funding from the
Graduate School at the University of Wisconsin.
i. Snopes.com, Urban Legends Reference Pages: Bill 6o2P, http://www.snopes.com/business/
taxes/bill6o2p.asp (last visited Mar. i, 2007).
2. Readers even remotely familiar with the federal legislative process will quickly see "Bill
602P" as a canard. See id. Bills in the United States Congress all begin with either "H.R." or "S." (for
those that originate in the House or Senate, respectively). Id. Be that as it may, fortunately for all of
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government to kill the goose of the Internet as it lays the golden eggs of
diffusion of information. Who, according to this tale, was behind this plot
to destroy what is now believed to be the most potent communications
medium in history? Not tax-and-spend liberals seeking more of your
money to spend on their pet projects. Not hard-nosed fiscal conservatives
trying to balance the budget on the backs of the poor. Instead, the folks
who brought you Bill 6o2P were none other than the evil monopolists
whose business model was most threatened by the e-mail revolution: the
United States Post Office.3
This image of the Post Office is one of a threatened monopolist and
government bureaucracy with entrenched interests that seeks to retard
the course of technological progress.4 In this vision one might even see
the Post Office as Professor Lawrence Lessig describes late twentieth
century big media and telecommunications companies,5 as dinosaurs
threatened by the Schumpeterian destabilizing impact of new
communication technologies,6 only worse -a public dinosaur.
That the Post Office is now viewed as a technologically backward
relic that has been replaced by the Internet is somewhat ironic. The Post
Office has always been a medium of communication and, like the
Internet, a medium that developed through a substantial amount of
conscious government policy. Moreover, the American Post Office is a
reflection of a uniquely American approach to communications and
media policy, and when it was established, it shaped the American polity
in ways that parallel the early visionary hopes for the Internet. Although
new communication technologies have almost always been accompanied
by utopian dreams of a society unencumbered by ignorance, inequality,
and poverty,7 the Post Office served as a very real vehicle for a
us, "Washington D.C. lawyer Richard Stepp [was] working without pay to prevent this legislation from
becoming law." Id. The letter, like many e-mail hoaxes, urged you to "[s]end this email to all
Americans on your list." Id. As with many urban legends, the e-mail tax hoax began to have a life of
its own, even snookering a New York City television reporter to ask about it during a televised Senate
candidate debate between Hillary Clinton and Rick Lazio in October 2000. Id. In response, both
candidates opposed the bill. See id.
3. See id. Currently, the legal name for the post office is the United States Postal Service.
Because the name of the institution changed several times through its history-most prominently
following the i97o Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, Aug. 12, 197o, 84 Stat. 761-I refer
to it throughout this Article, for simplicity's sake, as the "Post Office."
4. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 143-261 (2002).
5. See, e.g., id. at 143-44 (comparing these companies to "old Soviets"). See generally id. at 143-
261.
6. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-90 (1942); see also Phil
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 576-77
(2003).
7. See generally DANIEL J. CZITROM, MEDIA AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM MORSE TO McLUHAN
(1982); ROBERT EDWARD DAVIS, RESPONSE TO INNOVATION: A STUDY OF POPULAR ARGUMENT ABOUT
NEW MASS MEDIA (1976); CAROLYN MARVIN, WHEN OLD TECHNOLOGIES WERE NEW: THINKING ABOUT
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transformation in American society, just the sort that one imagines to be
the result of a vast increase in the free flow of information."
The Post Office is important, however, not simply because of the
extraordinary parallels between its development and that of the Internet,
but also because of its role in shaping modern First Amendment
doctrine. How exactly did the Post Office shape constitutional law? I
argue that early American policymakers gave the Post Office specific
attributes and that those attributes helped establish the Post Office as
what Professor Frederick Schauer calls a "First Amendment institution,"
an institution in society whose role judges recognized as furthering First
Amendment values in unique ways.9
The Post Office is not an ordinary First Amendment institution,
however. It is-and from the beginning has been-a government
institution. Moreover, in contrast to other government entities that one
could characterize as First Amendment institutions, such as public
libraries or public universities, it is the only one that spans the entire
history of the United States and is the principal, and original, federal
institution.
In this Article, I describe the American Post Office's historical
foundations -both legal and social-and explain how this historical
legacy directly shaped First Amendment doctrine during the twentieth
century. By laying out the historical foundations of the Post Office and
its impact on constitutional law in this way, I hope to make two principal
ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1988). For an interesting discussion
about beliefs that the telegraph would usher in a new era of international peace, see TOM STANDAGE,
THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY'S
ON-LINE PIONEERS 145-63 (1998). Nicholas Negroponte, the head of MIT's Media Laboratory, said
virtually the same thing about the Internet a hundred and fifty years later. See id. at 2o7. For an
argument that there is no "information revolution" and that digital technologies are not in fact "new"
or "revolutionary" communications technologies, see KRISHAN KUMAR, FROM POST-INDUSTRIAL TO
POST-MODERN SOCIETY: NEW THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 33-6o (2d ed. 2005). See also
JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD vii-ix
(2oo6); BRIAN WINSTON, MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A HISTORY FROM THE TELEGRAPH TO THE
INTERNET 321 -36 (1998); BRIAN WINSTON, MISUNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE END OF THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION (1986). But cf Richard R. John, Review of Media, Technology and Society, 31 J.
INTERDiSC. HIST. 296, 296-98 (2ooo) (arguing that Winston fails to engage with the complexity of the
history of technology).
8. The notion of the Post Office as a communication "technology" may be difficult to fathom
today, but commentators in the early nineteenth century described the Post Office as "annihilat[ing]"
time and distance and compared the information passing through the Post Office to an "electric
stream." RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO
MORSE IO-II (1995). A very similar phrase was used in referring to the telegraph during a famous
toast at a banquet held for Samuel Morse in December 1868: Morse, it was said, had "annihilated both
space and time in the transmission of intelligence." STANDAGE, supra note 7, at 90.
9. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84
(1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles]; Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment,




First, I argue that the Post Office has been an underappreciated
institution in the shaping of the modem First Amendment. The Supreme
Court first dealt with two important constitutional questions-First
Amendment restrictions on government subsidies for speech (i.e., First
Amendment "unconstitutional conditions") and the right to receive ideas
-in cases involving postal regulations. More importantly, I argue that
specific, unique aspects of the Post Office enabled the ,Court to first
articulate these important principles. It may well be-in fact, it is likely-
that today we would have these doctrines without the Post Office cases
from which they came. But their origins in postal policy shed light on
their underlying rationales in new and interesting ways.
Second, I describe an intriguing story of constitutional lawmaking.
The judges who interpreted the First Amendment in my examples were
in fact constitutionalizing legislation; they took earlier policy choices
made by Congress and embedded them into the Constitution. But these
were not ordinary policy choices; rather, they were legislative choices
about the character of an institution, and in particular an institution that
serves what we today view as First Amendment values. The process can
be described briefly in four steps: (i) Congress passes a statute. (2) The
statutory provisions give an institution certain attributes. (3) Over time,
social practice embeds those attributes into the institution. (4) The courts
then take those attributes and write them, in different ways, into the First
Amendment. In my examples, the Court's interpretations of the
Constitution were simply the affirmation of choices made by an earlier
legislature, with the institution serving as a mediating force between the
legislature and the courts. In short, by establishing an institution and
giving it particular attributes, the drafters of postal statutes helped shape
the First Amendment long after the promulgation of their statutes.i°
io. We might see this approach to constitutional lawmaking as one instantiation of what Robert
Post has called the "dialectical relationship" between judicial constitutional lawmaking and
"constitutional culture," or "the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors." Robert C. Post, Foreword,
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003). The
essence of my argument is that the early postal policymakers were relevant "nonjudicial actors" in
understanding the meaning of the Constitution, but more importantly, that the Post Office itself
eventually shaped the meaning of the Constitution as interpreted by the Court, by shaping the Court's
view of the normative questions it was asked to adjudicate. Cf. id. at 78-80 (arguing that the ultimate
dispute in United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), a case in which the
Court upheld a law conditioning federal funds to libraries on their installing filters on library internet
terminals, can best be seen as embodying disagreements about the social meaning and purpose of
public libraries).
Just to be clear, the form of constitutional lawmaking I am describing differs from the
constitutional lawmaking in Congress that David Currie describes in his series of books, The
Constitution in Congress. See DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-i8oi (1997) [hereinafter CURRIE, FEDERALIST PERIOD]; DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 18oi-i829 (20O); DAVID CURRIE, THE CoNsTrrTnoN IN CONGRESS:
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This Article is divided into two parts. Part I gives a legal and social
history of the formation of the American Post Office. I focus on two
dominant themes: subsidization of newspaper delivery, and the Post
Office's legal and practical monopoly over long-distance communication.
Putting these themes together, we can see the way that law helped create
and then shape the Post Office in unique ways, ways that later shaped the
First Amendment."
In Part II, I look at the first time the Court faced two important First
Amendment principles: First Amendment restrictions on government
subsidies, and the right to receive ideas. The Court first dealt with both
principles in the context of regulations of the Post Office. Both are now
viewed as abstract First Amendment principles that represent important
components of modem First Amendment doctrine. Their origins can best
be seen as reflecting unique aspects of the Post Office, aspects that
embody the two themes discussed in Part I. The First Amendment
principles were premised at the time on the Court's recognition of the
Post Office's character as an institution that served constitutional values
in particular ways. By embedding those institutional characteristics into
constitutional law, the Court furthered First Amendment principles but
did so by following the lead of early lawmakers who put those
characteristics into the institution in the first place.
I. THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN POST OFFICE: EMBEDDING
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS INTO A COMMUNICATIONS MEDIUM
Looking at the period between 1774, when the American Post Office
was established as an entity independent of the colonial Post Office, and
1792, when Congress passed the first comprehensive postal statute after
adoption of the Constitution, several themes emerge. The first, which I
discuss in Part I.A, is government subsidization of newspaper delivery.
Early American lawmakers adopted these subsidies with a conscious goal
DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-186I (2oo5); DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT
INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829-1861 (2oo6). In Currie's works, the focus is on lawmakers actually
interpreting the Constitution, whereas the phenomenon I am describing is a process by which
lawmakers believe that they are simply enacting ordinary statutes, and it is only later that the
principles embedded in those statutes become a matter of constitutional law as interpreted by the
courts.
ix. I should emphasize here that my reference to "law" in the text explicitly excludes the
Constitution. Strictly speaking, the Constitution was not irrelevant, since it is of course the
Constitution, in the first instance, that grants Congress the power "to establish Post Offices and post
Roads," without which the federal government would not have otherwise had power to implement
these policies. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 7. As I describe in greater detail, however, many of the
relevant policies derive from postal ordinances passed during the later years of the Continental
Congress-what historians refer to as the Confederation Congress, see, e.g., Richard P. McCormick,
Ambiguous Authority: The Ordinances of the Confederation Congress, 1781-1789, 41 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 411, 411 (1997)-and policies that even predate the ratification of the Articles of Confederation..
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of promoting republican" values through communications policy. In
doing so, the federal government not only affirmatively promoted what
today many theorists view as one of the fundamental rationales for the
First Amendment, but also shaped the Post Office as an institution.
In Part I.B, I discuss the second theme, the Post Office's legal and
practical monopoly over long-distance communication. The legal
monopoly had been established by the British and was incorporated in
turn by the Americans. However, in the unique American context with
its vast landmass, one important way in which the practical monopoly
was fostered was through a policy of postal expansion unparalleled in the
world. That expansion led to a ubiquity of mail service that, combined
with the legal monopoly, created widespread dependency on the postal
network for long distance communications.
Both of these themes gave the Post Office specific institutional
attributes that later were crucial in the shaping of constitutional doctrine.
In Part II, I connect these institutional attributes with specific First
Amendment decisions and demonstrate how the Court recognized these
institutional characteristics and embedded them into the First
Amendment.
A. POSTAL SUBSIDIES FOR NEWS
Government subsidies'3 played an important role in the American
12. I use the term "republican" here in the eighteenth century sense, simply to contrast the
American "republic" with the English "monarchy." See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITrrION 6 (2OO5). I am not using the term to refer to the classical
republicans of antiquity or the particular American Whigs and English "opposition" or "country"
party theorists who were so influential in the founding of the country. See generally BERNARD BAILYN,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). I thus do not mean to enter any
debate about how much these lawmakers were influenced by the Whigs as opposed to either Locke or
enlightenment theorists such as Montesquieu. See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra, at 7-23. I am also
not using the term in the way that modern legal theorists, such as Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman, or
Cass Sunstein, use it to refer to "civic republicanism."
13. I should perhaps clarify my use of the term "subsidy." As I describe further below, the early
American Post Office was expected to, and did, break even until well into the nineteenth century. The
"subsidies" were public in a nominal sense. At the time, the postal network itself was not subsidized by
government revenues from other sources. See George L. Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in
the United States, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 33, 55 (I975). Instead, one group of users of the postal network-
letter-writers-subsidized another- newspaper publishers. We might thus think of these subsidies as
analogous to those embedded in the E-rate program for contemporary telecommunications services,
which requires telecommunications customers to contribute to a fund from which others (e.g., libraries
and schools from poorer communities) receive subsidies to purchase the same services. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 254 (2000). Under contemporary jurisprudence, such cross-subsidization is viewed as government
spending. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172-73 (992). See generally Anuj C. Desai,
Filters and Federalism: Public Library Internet Access, Local Control, and the Federal Spending Power,
7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. I, 101-03 (20O4).
My use of these terms is thus prochronistic in some sense. Nonetheless, accepting the rhetoric of
the time on its face, it is clear that policymakers knew that the government was providing newspaper
publishers with a service at well below both average and marginal cost.
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Post Office in the early republic. The American Post Office that
developed in the first half-century of the republic was, at the time, unlike
any postal system in the world in one important respect. For the first
time in history, government officials began to view the postal network
not simply as a revenue-generating enterprise, but as a tool for
promoting the ideals of a republic in which the people were sovereign.
Viewing newspapers as one of the principal means to strengthen the
republican foundations of the young nation, early American
policymakers provided significant postal subsidies for the delivery of
newspapers."
In this Part, I describe the development of those subsidies, beginning
with the pre-Revolutionary era and culminating with the incorporation
of those subsidies into the legal framework of the Post Office with the
passage of the landmark Post Office Act of 1792. One prominent feature
of these subsidies was the fact that they were based on the format of the
communication (i.e., printed newspaper, as opposed to hand-written
letter) but were independent of its content. The subsidies were thus
based on what we might today call "network neutrality"" -not complete
14. I should be clear here that I am making a historical point, not an economic argument. There
are huge debates about how much, or even whether, government should provide, or subsidize,
communications as an economic matter. The principal argument in favor of subsidization is that the
government should invest in infrastructure, or what some economists refer to as "social overhead
capital." See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 83-86 (1958); D. Biehl,
The Role of Infrastructure in Regional Development, in INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
9-35 (R.W. Vickerman ed., 199i). See generally CARL DANNER, "INFRASTRUCTURE" AND THE TELEPHONE
NETWORK: DEFINING THE PROBLEM iii (I992) (defining and developing a three-part typology for
understanding the word "infrastructure" in the context of telecommunications). By doing so, the
argument goes, the government enables, or contributes to, the conditions necessary for further
productive economic activity: a communications infrastructure is thereby lumped together with certain
other types of basic services, such as transportation, power (e.g., electrical), water, and (less
analogously) law and order. The assumption underlying the necessity of government investment is of
course that, for whatever reasons-externalities, high capital-output ratios, etc. -the private sector will
not invest in a communications network. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMr. SCI. 22,40 (197); Priest, supra note 13, at 53. Given what seems in retrospect to be too
much private investment in telecommunications infrastructure over the past decade, see Olga Kharif,
The Fiber Optic Glut-in a New Light, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Aug. 31, 2001,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2ooi/nf2ooio831-396.htm, one has to wonder
whether the resolution of even that debate might be contingent on an individual country's stage of
economic development. See, e.g., Milton Mueller, Telecommunication as Infrastructure: A Skeptical
View, 43 J. COMM. 147, 148-49 (1993) (noting the way in which the phrase "infrastructure" was
transformed in the I98OS from the notion that underdeveloped countries needed to establish telephone
service as a precursor to economic growth to the notion that the U.S. had to modernize its already
functional network in order to facilitate economic growth); id. at 156 ("[Tihe efficiency contributions
of telecommunications investments and usage depend entirely on where and how they are made.").
15. Compare Timothy Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 141
(2oo3), with Christopher Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847
(2oo6), and Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, The Myth of Network Neutrality and What We Should




network neutrality, but a form of neutrality nonetheless. As I argue in
Part II.A, the neutrality built into the allocation of these subsidies
became so embedded into the institutional structure of the Post Office
that aspects of that allocation became a matter of First Amendment law.
i. Pre-Revolutionary Era
As I noted in the Introduction, our modem conception of the
government postal system views it as having attributes of a monopoly.
6
This communications monopoly was crucial to the pre-Revolutionary
notion that a post office was an ideal method for raising revenue for the
government. The Post Office was, in essence, a means of taxation. Prices
were generally well above the cost of providing service, and there was
only one place to get the service, the government monopoly provider.
This so-called "fiscal rationale" for a postal system had long been
assumed prior to the American Revolution. 7 In 1692, William and Mary
gave Thomas Neale, the first official colonial "Postmaster" in British
North America, a royal grant to establish a postal system in exchange for
a mere six shillings per year. Key to the grant was the guarantee that
Neale was entitled to all of the profits from the enterprise. Whether a
i6. The United States Postal Service's current monopoly extends to the delivery of "letters" and
"packets," the latter of which refers simply to "two or more letters ... under one cover or otherwise
bound together." 39 C.F.R. § 31o.i(b) (2005); accord I8 U.S.C. §§ 1696, 1697 (2ooo); 39 U.S.C. § 6ol
(2000); 39 C.F.R. § 3Io. The definition of "letter," which excludes a vast number of things, has
historically been used to respond to political pressures from groups that wanted to exclude themselves
from the postal monopoly. 39 C.F.R. § 31o.I(a)(7); see Priest, supra note 13, at 77-79, 78 n.219.
17. The phrase "fiscal rationale" is historian Richard R. John's. See JOHN, supra note 8, at 25-26.
This rationale did not, however, guarantee the British Post Office a profit, nor did it result in
consistent increases in prices or volume of mail delivered. Other considerations affected postal policy.
For one, the basic economic fact that, even with respect to a monopoly service, at some point, a rise in
rates will result in a decrease in total revenues if the price significantly enough impacts the demand for
the service. More important, though, was the tension between Parliament, whose members jealously
guarded their franking privilege-the right of members to send mail for free-and the Treasury
Department. Since more "pay letters" invariably resulted in fewer franked letters because of limits on
how much could be carried, the result was a compromise, and not always one that resulted in
maximizing profit. See KENNETH ELLIS, THE POST OFFICE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, A STUDY IN
ADMINISnTATIvE HISTORY 39-46 (1958). Nonetheless, the British Post Office clearly saw the need to
portray itself as a net revenue-generating enterprise, as its accounts showed profits-even if it did not
always generate real profits-throughout the eighteenth century. See id. at 44-46. This was as true in
the colonies as in England. See WESLEY EVERETr RICH, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES POST
OFFICE TO THE YEAR 1829, at 91 (1924) ("Until the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the aim
had been to secure a small revenue from the office, or at least to make it self-supporting."); id. at 71
("The policy in colonial times had been to make a profit out of the postal business."); Julian P. Bretz,
Some Aspects of Postal Extension into the West, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR i909, at 141, 143 (1911) ("Prior to the Revolution ... [t]he [Plost [O]ffice
was regarded as a source of revenue to the Crown, and in accordance with this theory post roads had
been established only where they were profitable."). In short, the Post Office was seen as an optional
service provided by the Crown with its goal being seen as maximizing net profits. One place this can be
seen is by the fact that Blackstone's discussion of the Post Office is in his chapter on "the King's
Revenue." See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *323 (1765) ("There cannot be devised a more
eligible method than this, of raising money.").
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communications network such as a postal system is a "natural" monopoly
or not," monopoly it would be and, indeed, a monopoly without
regulation. The fact of the monopoly, in other words, gave the Post
Office a unique opportunity for profit. There was of course no way to
ensure that people would want to communicate over great distances but,
if they did, the monopoly provided a unique opportunity for outsized
profits. Unfortunately, Neale was an abject failure in capitalizing on his
monopoly and lost large sums of money.'9 Upon his death, his creditors
inherited the monopoly, but they too had great difficulty turning a
profit.'0 Finally, in 1707, the Crown relieved Neale's creditors and took
over the postal monopoly in the colonies.'
As the postal network slowly grew through the early years of the
eighteenth century, the monopoly began to encompass a new service: the
newspaper.22 Recognizing that a monopoly over the "conduit" through
which people communicated provided unique opportunities for
disseminating "content," early eighteenth century postmasters began to
take on another role -printer- and to provide a complementary service
to postal delivery: publishing news.
This leveraging of the postal monopoly to establish what amounted
to a second monopoly caused few problems until competition began to
creep into the business of publishing. As one might imagine, control over
the postal network gave postmasters the ability to undermine competing
printers.
When competition increased in some communities and more
publishers sought to print newspapers, the Postmaster's role increasingly
became a huge competitive advantage. Indeed, the Postmaster-publisher
effectively used his position to discriminate against other publishers. 3
Controlling the "pipes" or the conduit through which communication
flowed gave the Postmaster a huge advantage when it came to controlling
18. A "natural monopoly" is one in which " a single firm can serve the whole market (however
defined) with lower overall costs per customer than could multiple firms." JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN
& PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET
AGE 12 (2005). Following the postal reorganization of 197o, the Governors of the Postal Service
submitted a report to Congress concluding that the postal network was a "natural monopoly." See
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 93d CONG., REPORT ON STATUTES RESTRICTING
PRIVATE CARRIAGE OF MAIL AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION 9-10 (Comm. Print 1973). The claim was highly
controversial. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 13, at 69-71.
19. See Priest, supra note 13, at 44.
20. Id.
2i. Id.
22. See FRANK LUTHER MOTr, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY: 1690 TO 1960, at 11-14 (3d ed.
1964) (noting that Boston's Postmaster John Campbell founded the "first continuous American
newspaper" in 1704); id. at 14-15 (noting that after an initial spat between Campbell and his successor,
who viewed the newspaper as "one of the perquisites of his office," newspapers remained with a series
of five postmasters following Campbell).
23. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 76 (1983).
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the content that could be distributed through that conduit.
As a young publisher in the 173os, Benjamin Franklin was one of the
first to suffer from the Postmasters' network monopoly when
Philadelphia Postmaster Andrew Bradford, himself a competing
publisher, refused to permit Franklin's Gazette into the mails. 4 In order
to distribute his publication, Franklin had to bribe the post-riders. 5
Franklin learned his lesson well and by 1737 got himself named
Postmaster of Philadelphia. 6 For much of the eighteenth century, then,
mail delivery of newspapers had an "indeterminate status," 7 dependent
upon the whims of local postmasters. When Franklin was named Deputy
Postmaster General for the colonies in the 1750s, 5 he and co-Deputy
Postmaster General William Hunter regularized that status to a certain
extent, issuing regulations that explicitly required postmasters to collect
postage for the delivery of all newspapers."
Newspapers and the postal network as a distribution channel were
deeply intertwined by the 176os, as tensions between the colonists and
the mother country increased. Newspapers and pamphlets, distributed
through the mail, became one of the principal vehicles by which colonists
communicated amongst themselves. The nature of colonial newspapers
was changing, and the center of gravity was moving away from
communication solely with or through London and towards more direct
contact among the colonies." Newspapers were increasingly providing
colonists "'the Notice of the Tyrannical Designs formed against America,
and [were] kindl[ing] a Spirit that has been sufficient to repel them."' 3
The postal network was thus also becoming crucial to the inter-colony
24. See AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 71 (Airmont Books 1965).
25. Id.
26. RICHARD B. KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE AND PUBLIC
INFORMATION, 1700-I86OS, at 16 (1989).
27. Id. at I7.
28. See 5 PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN I8 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., 1962).
29. See RUTH LAPHAM BUTLER, DOCTOR FRANKLIN: POSTMASTER GENERAL 57-58 (1928). The one
exception to this rule was the exchange privilege, which permitted newspaper publishers to send
copies of their papers to other printers for free. See id. at 58.
30. See TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A POLITICAL
INSTTmON 40 (1998) ("[T]he percentage of news about British North America ... increased, as news
items from other colonies from 1728 to 1765 were taken less from London than from other colonial
newspapers."); see also, e.g., Charles E. Clark & Charles Wetherell, The Measure of Maturity: The
Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728-I765, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 279, 296 (1989) (noting that use of the postal
exchange privilege "involved [readers] increasingly in a shared world of experience with the rest of
British North America").
31. KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 23 (quoting Letter from John Holt to John Adams (1776)).
Though Holt's letter to Adams is from 1776, Holt is describing the past and the ways in which
newspapers had been used to promote the inter-colonial cohesion in opposition to the Crown prior to
his writing of that letter. Id.; accord Mort, supra note 22, at 71 (noting that during the period from
1765 to 1783, "American political affairs took on more and more importance" in the publication of
news).
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communication that was necessary for spurring the Revolutionary War.
2. Revolutionary Era
In 1773 the British commissioned Hugh Finlay, who was then in
charge of the Canadian Post Office, to do a study of the entire North
American postal system. One of Finlay's conclusions was that
newspapers were overburdening the mails.32 By this point, however,
tensions were increasing between the Crown and the colonists. American
printers were still using the British-controlled Post Office, but a number
of parallel private posts had sprung up-in clear violation of the postal
monopoly-for deliveries to unserved areas and for faster delivery.33
These private posts were undermining the official post's revenue and,
according to Finlay, it was
next to impossible to put a stop to this practice in the present universal
opposition to every thing connected with Great Britain. Were any
Deputy Post Master to do his duty, and make a stir in such matter, he
would draw on himself the odium of his neighbours and be mark'd as
the friend of Slavery and oppression and a declar'd enemy to
America.34
Most prominent of these parallel networks was the one established
by printer William Goddard, whose Pennsylvania Chronicle began in
January I767."5 Goddard had had trouble with the official posts from the
beginning because Philadelphia's Postmaster at the time was William
Bradford,: himself a newspaper printer and a direct competitor of
Goddard's Chronicle. Prior to his move to Philadelphia, Goddard had
lived in Providence, where he had been both a printer and the
Postmaster, so he understood the value that control over the postal
network gave to a printer.37 By late 1773, it became clear to Goddard that
a printer needed his own network and-more fundamentally- that the
many colonists who were increasingly dissatisfied with relations with the
Crown could no longer count on the official Post Office, what Goddard
32. HUGH FINLAY, THE HUGH FINLAY JOURNAL: COLONIAL POSTAL HISTORY, 1773-1774, at 41, 43
(1975); accord KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 2o.
33. KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 21.
34. FINLAY, supra note 32, at 32.
35. See WARD L. MINER, WILLIAM GODDARD, NEWSPAPERMAN 70,72 (1962).
36. Bradford was the nephew and prot6g6 of Andrew Bradford, the Postmaster-printer who had
refused to allow postal delivery of Benjamin Franklin's paper three decades earlier. See supra text
accompanying note 24.
37. Though he was the official Postmaster, his mother and sister did the postal work most of the
time. See MINER, supra note 35, at 113. His sister, Mary Katherine Goddard, eventually became the
Postmaster-or "Postmistress," as she called herself-of Baltimore between 1775 and 1789, one of the
few women serving in the federal government during the revolutionary era. See Richard R. John &
Christopher J. Young, Rites of Passage: Postal Petitioning as a Tool of Governance in the Age of
Federalism, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT tOO, iO (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002).
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and others called the "Parliamentary Post." '
By early 1774, Goddard had sketched out a plan to establish what he
referred to as a "Constitutional Post" to provide service entirely
independent of the British.39 He traveled through New England in the
first half of 1774 drumming up support for the plan.4' By the beginning of
June 1774, the "constitutional or Goddard's [P]ost [O]ffice, as it was
sometimes called," was in operation from Falmouth on Casco Bay in
what was then the District of Maine all the way down to Baltimore.4'
During the summer, Goddard traveled south and by August, he had
extended his postal network down to Williamsburg, Virginia.4" Given the
sparseness of the population of Georgia and the Carolinas, this was
effectively a network throughout the full extent of the colonies.43 Nearly
two years before formal independence, the American colonies had
established a communications network independent of the British.'
Goddard's "Constitutional Post" was still "private," however, and in
October 1774 Goddard tried to convince the First Continental Congress
to adopt his network.' He was unsuccessful, because at the time most of
the Congress still worried about alienating the British.46 By the next year,
however, in the wake of the Battle of Lexington and Concord, attitudes
had changed, and the Second Continental Congress began to recognize
the military need for an independent communications network.47 On May
29, 1775, the Second Continental Congress established a committee, with
Benjamin Franklin at its head, "to consider the best means of
establishing Posts for conveying Letters and Intelligence through this
Continent ''14 and on July 26th adopted Goddard's postal system. 49 By this
point, most postmasters had resigned their British commissions and had
38. MINER, supra note 35, at 113-14. It became clear to others as well. The Boston Tea Party was
December 16, 1773, and news of the event reached Philadelphia by Christmas and Baltimore by the
3oth only because Goddard had by then hired his own post-riders who brought the news. See id.
39. Id. at 131.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 132.
43. Id. at 132-33.
44. Id. at 133. See generally KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 21-22.
45. MINER, supra note 35, at 133-34.
46. Id.; I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 55 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., 1904) ("An address from William Goddard to the Congress was read and ordered to lie on
the table.").
47. MINER, supra note 35, at 135.
48. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 71 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 19o5).
49. Id. at 135, 208-09; see also LINDSAY ROGERS, THE POSTAL POWER OF CONGRESS: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION 13 (1916) ("The establishment of postal facilities was one of the first
problems taken up by the Continental Congress when it began to exercise sovereign powers which it
did not legally possess but which of necessity it had to assume.").
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begun working within Goddard's network."
Throughout 1775 the "parliamentary Post Office" was increasingly
abandoned as a means of communication, not only by American military
and state officials but also by ordinary letter-writers. By the end of the
year, it was hemorrhaging finances at such a rate that it became
impractical for the British to maintain it. The coup de grace came at the
end of 1775." In mid-December, the Maryland Assembly passed a
motion forbidding the "parliamentary post" from passing through
Maryland and, on Christmas Day, the Secretary of the British Post Office
in New York announced the cessation of British postal deliveries in the
colonies. 2 As historian Carl Bridenbaugh has written, "[t]hus occurred
the first institutional change of the American Revolution": the
establishment of a communications network that would "play[ ] a vital
role in bringing about American independence."53 It was Goddard's
"constitutional post" network, and its adoption by the Second
Continental Congress, that began a transformation of American
communications policy. Though the adoption of Goddard's post was
motivated largely by military necessity, its initial establishment was due
to a printer's attempt to ensure delivery of his newspapers to the
populace at large. As I explain in more detail below, the historical origins
of the postal network as a vehicle for the distribution of news continued
to play an important role through the period of the Confederation and
culminated in the passage of the 1792 Post Office Act.
Given Goddard's initial interest in providing a network for
distributing his own newspaper, there is little question that he saw
newspaper distribution as a crucial component of what a postal service
should do. There is also evidence of this from Goddard's proposal itself.
When he first proposed his "constitutional post," he set forth a series of
"Model Rules" for the enterprise, one of which was to appoint
Postmasters, who would, inter alia, "regulate ... the terms on which
newspapers are to be carried."54
During the remainder of the Revolutionary War, newspaper delivery
was a minor issue, as the security of correspondence became the crucial
concern of the Continental Congress and postal authorities.55 By 1782,
50. BUTLER, supra note 29, at i6o.
51, MINER, supra note 35, at 135.
52. Id. at 136; WILLIAM SMITH, THE HISTORY OF THE POST OFFICE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1639-
187o, at 65 (1920); Notice from the General Post-Office, New York (Dec. 25, 1775), in PETER FORCE, 4
AMERICAN ARCHIVES, SERIES 4, at 453.
53. MINER, supra note 35, at 136.
54. Mr. Goddard's Proposal for Establishing an American Post Office (July 2, 1774), reprinted in
PETER FORCE, I AMERICAN ARCHIVES, SERIES 4, at 502; accord RICH, supra note 17, at 45.
55. See Anuj C. Desai, The Birth of Communications Privacy, Part 1, 60 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007); KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 22 ("Adapting postal operations to the vicissitudes
of war preoccupied Franklin and other officials; they had little time to devote to the relative niceties of
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however, when the Continental Congress passed its comprehensive
postal ordinance, it explicitly provided that newspapers could be





Although the reference to "moderate" rates might have implied
subsidized rates, the result was, as one might expect, complete discretion
for the Postmaster General.57 An earlier draft of the law shows, however,
that at least in some people's minds there was a link between reduced
rates for newspapers and promoting the dissemination of information
about public affairs. Deleted from the eventual law was preambulary
language that read as follows: "And whereas it will greatly tend to the
communication of due information to the inhabitants of these United
States to enable the transportation of public newspapers by the post-
riders at a cheaper rate than the postage of letters, packets or other
despatches."5 While this language was struck from the ordinance that the
Continental Congress eventually passed, its very existence suggests an
early connection between newspaper subsidies and what historian
Richard R. John calls an "educational rationale" for a postal network.59
From the establishment of the "American" Post Office in 1774-1775
through the 183Os, the purpose of the Post Office in the United States
newspaper postage with the very survival of the [P]ost [O]ffice, and new nation, at stake."); RICH,
supra note 17, at 49 (noting that principal concern of the Post Office "was the problem of keeping a
sure and speedy line of communication open between Congress and the armies in the field").
56. An Ordinance for Regulating the Post Office of the United States of America (Oct. 18, 1782),
reprinted in 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 67o, 677 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1914) ("And be it ordained by the authority aforesaid, that it shall and may be lawful for the
Postmaster General, or any of his deputies, to license every post-rider to carry any newspapers to and
from any place or places within these United States, at such moderate rates as the Postmaster General
shall establish, he rendering the post-riders accountable to the Postmaster General, or the respective
deputy postmasters by whom they shall severally be employed, for such proportion of the moneys
arising therefrom as the Postmaster General shall think proper, to be by him credited to these United
States in his general account."); see also KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 23.
57. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 23.
58. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 56, at 677 n. I.
59. JOHN, supra note 8, at 3o; accord KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 22 (describing a letter from
John Holt, a newspaperman and former Postmaster, to John Adams explaining why the public "had an
interest in facilitating the circulation of public information" through the mails). Language in the
Articles of Confederation also suggests, albeit obliquely, the idea that the Post Office was meant to
provide a public service rather than simply be a tool for raising revenue. The Articles gave Congress
the power to "establish[ ] and regulat[e] post offices" but, in doing so, limited the power to "exact[ I
... postage" to that which "may be requisite to defray the expences [sic] of the said office." Articles of
Confederation, art. IX (Nov. 15, 1777), reprinted in 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-
1789, at 99 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., t9o7) [hereinafter 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789]; see also Second Draft of Articles of Confederation, art. XIV (Aug. 20, 1776),
reprinted in 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 682 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., t9o6) [hereinafter 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789]; cf. RICH, supra
note I7, at 58-59 (noting that this provision suggests that the Post Office "was intended to be of public
service rather than a source of revenue" because "[i]t was ... provided that any surplus which might
arise was to be put back into the office, in the betterment and extension of postal facilities").
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went through a transformation. Though the fiscal rationale remained at
least part of the thinking of some of those seeking independence, 6, the
question of newspaper subsidization became part of a larger debate
about the purpose of a postal network. Over time, the educational
rationale overtook the fiscal rationale in importance.
This transformation away from the fiscal rationale, and toward the
educational rationale, was premised on republican 6' ideology and the role
that communications and the free flow of information play in fostering
both an informed electorate and civil society. In January 1787, Benjamin
Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence 6 ' and an important
member of the Pennsylvania Convention for ratifying the Constitution,
gave one of the clearest contemporary articulations of the ideological
underpinnings of this shift. In an "Address to the People of the United
States," he proposed two policy recommendations: first, that Congress
provide for the conveyance of newspapers for free; and second, that it
turn what had been at the time a network confined primarily to the
larger towns of the Eastern seaboard into a nationwide network that
reached into every town, including those in the interior.' He made clear
that both proposals were directly tied to his view about the importance of
the Post Office as a vehicle for fostering, in the new citizens of a young
country, the republican values that would prove to be necessary. Thus,
key to the proposal to provide free distribution of newspapers through
the Post Office was a belief in the importance of that medium of
communication in promoting republican ideals.
Rush was by no means the only one to understand the connection
between a long-distance communications network and the cohesion of
the new republic. George Washington, for example, also saw the need for
a postal network to disseminate political news. The early Postmasters
60. Governor Morris, for example, noted in 1777 that the Post Office was the perfect vehicle for
revenue-raising because "it constituted payment for a service that the taxpayer could conveniently
secure in no other way." JOHN, supra note 8, at 26. Moreover, with respect to the postal monopoly, this
"fiscal rationale" survived well into the nineteenth century. See United States v. Bromley, 53 U.S. 88,
96-97 (1851) (characterizing the postal monopoly as a "revenue law" when interpreting a statute
granting the United States Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over cases involving violations of
"revenue laws"). Indeed, understanding the postal monopoly in terms of the fiscal rationale even helps
explain at least one modern-day First Amendment case, United States Postal Service v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). In that case, the Supreme Court relied primarily
on the long history of the postal monopoly on "mailable matter" to uphold the constitutionality of a
statute that prohibited the deposit of unstamped "mailable matter" in a mailbox approved by the
United States Postal Service. Id. at I 16, 123-24.
61. As I mentioned in the Introduction, I use the term "republican" here to refer simply to the
general notion of a republican form of government. See supra note 12.
62. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
63. See, e.g., 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTrrTrION 456 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
64. Benjamin Rush, Address to the People of the United States, I AM. MUSEUM 8, 10 (5787). I will
return to Rush's second proposal in Part I.B.2, infra.
65. See RICH, supra note I7, at 68 (quoting Washington's Message to Congress in 1791: "[Tlhe
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General likewise regarded their task as using the Post Office to
disseminate information, particularly political information, to the
furthest reaches of the nation, notwithstanding the costs ofS• 66
transmission. Madison and Jefferson both also saw the Post Office as an
indispensable link in disseminating information. 67 In an era in which most
political theorists believed that democracy was only possible in small
political units because of the need for the electorate to act as a direct
check on the officers of the government, 68 a conduit for political
information was a necessary condition for maintenance of a democracy
over such a geographically dispersed area.
To be fair, the notion of using the postal network to deliver
newspapers, though premised on the "educational rationale," was not as
radical a break with the practice of the British Post Office as its
importance of the [Plost [Olffice and post roads ... is increased by their instrumentality in diffusing a
knowledge of the laws and proceedings of the Government, which, while it contributes to the security
of the people, seryes also to guard them against the consequences of misrepresentation and
misconception."); Priest, supra note 13, at 51-53. Professor Priest has characterized Washington as
"manipulat[ing] postal operations with an undisguised intent to accumulate power," noting his rapid
expansion of the Post Office in the South and West (an issue I discuss in Part I.B.2, infra) in order to
"bring unity to the country." Priest, supra note 13, at 51, 53. Whether it is correct to characterize
Washington as trying to "accumulate power," there is no doubt that his rhetoric appealed to
republican principles in a way that would have been odd if articulated as such in England at the time.
As historian Richard Leffler suggested to me, Washington's rhetorical appeal to what would have
been viewed as shared republican values may have been a legacy of the intense controversy involving
accusations that federalist postmasters had purposely slowed delivery of anti-federalist papers and
pamphlets during debates on the ratification of the Constitution in 1787-88. See The Controversy Over
the Post Office and the Circulation of Newspapers, in XVI THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITTION 540-42 (John Kaminski et al. eds., 1986). During the debates, Anti-
federalists accused Postmaster General Hazard and local postmasters of using their position to slow
the delivery of anti-federalist publications for political reasons. Id. Hazard rejected the charge, noting
that because exchange papers were delivered for free, the uneven delivery might simply have been the
result of postmasters favoring the delivery of postage-paying mail in order to increase their
commissions. Id. Indeed, federalists likewise complained about newspaper delivery, though not nearly
as much. Id. One historian has suggested that the disparate impact felt by the anti-federalists might
simply have been due to the fact that their support was stronger in the hinterland, where service was
not as good as it was along the seaboard. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 143-44.
66. See generally RICH, supra note 17, at 69-71, 91-92 (discussing the importance of the Post
Office in disseminating political intelligence throughout the new nation).
67. See JOHN, supra note 8, at 32 (noting that Madison saw the postal system as the "'principal
channel' through which the citizenry secured its 'general knowledge' of public affairs") (quoting Letter
from James Madison to Henry Lee (Jan. 21, 1792), in 14 HUTCHINSON, PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 193);
KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 36-37 (noting Jefferson's arguments for low postage rates for the
purposes of disseminating public information); President Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message
(Dec. 8, i8oi), in JAMES D. RICHARDSON, I A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 326, 328 (1896); cf. James Madison, Public Opinion, NATIONAL GAZETTE,
Dec. 19, 1791, quoted in VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 233-34 (Thompson West
20o6) ("Whatever facilitates ... particularly a circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the
people ... is favorable to liberty"), available at http://www.constitution.org/jml/
1791 121 9opinion.txt.
68. See, e.g., MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
SOCIAL-CONSTrrUnONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, at 244 (3d ed. 1962).
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ideological differences with the fiscal rationale might suggest. From the
Licensing Act of 1662, when the Crown first enjoyed a legal monopoly
over printing, through the middle of the eighteenth century, the English
government used the Post Office as a vehicle for propaganda.69 The Post
Office often delivered government pamphlets and subsidized newspapers
(known as Pension Papers) for free.'0 In this sense, the Post Office acted
as a very real propaganda arm of the Crown.7 ' Though the opposition
press obtained the right to publish with the expiration of the Licensing
Act in 1695, it was subject to the law of libel (at a time at which any
criticism of the government constituted libel)7" and in 1712, the
government began imposing exorbitant charges under the first Stamp
Act partly to raise revenue and partly in response to the increased
influence of the opposition.7 This tax was simply for the privilege of
publishing and was completely independent of postal delivery. But by the
176os and 1770s the opposition press had grown and also gradually had
begun to gain access to the Post Office.74 More importantly, this access
was increasingly at the same subsidized postal rates as the government
press-i.e., free! -because the 1764 Franking Act had given members of
Parliament and Peers in the House of Lords a statutory franking
privilege, which was used to distribute opposition newspapers. 7' By the
178os, certain members of the House of Commons were so widely
"sharing" their right to mail periodicals for free that booksellers and
printers began to use the names of Members of Parliament without
permission.76 By 1790, the general public became increasingly aware of
the practice of using forged franks and so adopted it as well. By the early
nineteenth century, then, virtually all British newspapers were being sent
through the mails for free.77
Notwithstanding the fact that English newspapers were similarly
subsidized in fact, the American approach, premised on the notion that a
communications network was central to an educated populace, viewed
the Post Office in very different terms. It was an approach rooted in the
very attitude that the Founders brought to structuring government. In a
69. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 47-49.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. LAURENCE WILLIAM HANSON, GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS, 1695-1763, at 17-18 (1936).
73. Id. at 11-12. This led to a short-term reduction in the number of periodicals printed and
distributed. Id. But, because the law had been poorly drafted, imposing levies only on newspapers of
one sheet (four pages) or two (eight pages), printers began to publish six-page papers, which allowed
the printers to distribute through the Post Office without paying the tax. Id.
74. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 51.
75. Id. at 51-54.
76. Id. at 54; HERBERT JOYCE, THE HISTORY OF THE POST OFFICE FROM ITS ESTABLISHMENT DOWN TO
1836, at 192 (1893).
77. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 54-59. Newspapers in Britain were still subject to the stamp tax. See
generally HANSON, supra note 72, at I 1-12.
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republic, in which the people-not the Crown and not Parliament-are
sovereign, the people need to be able to share information with each
other, especially "news" about public affairs.
This is of course precisely the premise underlying the various
interpretations of the First Amendment that stress democratic
governance, from Meiklejohn to Bork.78 What is different, however, is
that the role that federal officials played in affirmatively promoting those
values contrasts sharply with the notion that it is the job of the judiciary
to enforce those values against the legislative and executive branches of
government. Indeed, this very basic historical fact raises serious
questions about First Amendment theories that call for an arm's length
relationship between government and the press. While this historical
story does not directly undermine the normative basis of such theories, it
raises important questions about whether such approaches to the First
Amendment conflict so profoundly with the real, rather than imagined,
historical tradition of the government-press relationship in the United
States as to render them unrealistic as a practical matter.
For those who worry about having the government involved in
communications policy any more than might seem necessary, this history
might create some unease. While I do not want to be seen as taking a
position on any of these normative theories, I do contend that any First
Amendment theory based on originalism,79 or that incorporates the
United States historical tradition, ° must contend with this intertwined
relationship. A theorist might wish to reject this history as normatively
unpalatable, but s/he would have to deal with the prospect that, as a
historical matter, the American press most likely would have been
significantly impoverished without the federal government's affirmative
role in promoting it.8'
This connection between the early postal privileges for newspapers• 82
and the First Amendment's Press Clause has been noted in the history,
political science, 83 and communications8 1 literature. With one important
78. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (i97i); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245; see
also CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
79. See, e.g. Bork, supra note 78.
8o. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR
FOUND. L.J. 521.
8i. If we view constitutional law in part as the means by which "we are able to constitute
ourselves" as a nation in light of "our own distinctive history," as political theorist Hanna Pitkin has
put it, a normative constitutional theory that ignores that history-in all its complexity-risks
irrelevance outside of the academy. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 167, 169 (1987).
82. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 31.
83. The most influential work in this area is Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool's Technologies of
Freedom, which discusses the Post Office as an integral, early component of U.S. communications
policy. See POOL, supra note 23, at 75-91. Pool states that
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exception," however, it has been virtually ignored by First Amendment
scholars, even those whose work explores the historical origins of the
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.
[tihe twentieth century notion that the proper relation between government and the press is
one of arm's-length adversaries has no roots in the thinking of the founding fathers. Their
belief in the importance of the press not only led them to insist that Congress pass no law
"abridging the freedom of... the press" but also persuaded them to subsidize the press.
Id. at 78.
84. See Stephen A. Smith, Promoting Political Expression: The Impact of Three Constitutional
Provisions, 27 FREE SPEECH YEARBOOK I, 12-20 (5989).
85. The only legal scholarship of which I am aware that has seriously engaged the importance of
the postal subsidies to understanding the First Amendment is Professor Baker's seminal work on
media regulation and democracy. See C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based
Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 Sup. Cr. REV. 57, 94-99, 105-I1; see also C. Edwin Baker, An
Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1432-33 (2000); C. Edwin
Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 367 (1997); C. Edwin Baker, Media
Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 761-62 (2005); C.
Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and Cable, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 97, 109 (994). Others have
mentioned it in passing. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control:
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J.
1619, 1635-36 (1995); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1302-03 n.25 (1984); Neil Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society, io6 YALE L.J. 283, 357 n.338 (1996); cf. Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and
Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHM L. REv. 263, 293-94 (1986) (noting the
importance of the exchange privilege, the postal policy of allowing newspaper printers to exchange
one copy of their papers with any other printer for free). In a recent book review of Professor Paul
Starr's monumental history of American communications policy, The Creation of the Media, Professor
Phil Weiser also briefly discusses early postal policy, pointedly noting constitutional scholars' failure to
recognize the importance of the constitutional provision granting Congress the power to establish post
offices and post roads. Philip J. Weiser, The Ghost of Telecommunications Past, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1671, 1674-76 (2005). Starr's discussion of these issues, which Weiser describes, relies primarily on the
work of historians Richard Kielbowicz and Richard R. John, from whom I have likewise borrowed
liberally throughout this Article. See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 87-90 (2004).
Professor David Currie's work on the Constitution in Congress notes the connection between the
postal power and the First Amendment in the context of Elbridge Gerry's advocating in favor of
Members of Congress being able to frank newspapers for free. See CURRIE, FEDERALIST PERIOD, supra
note io, at 151; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 606, 633 (1996). Currie's easy dismissal of Gerry's arguments and the fact that he does
not cite to any of the debate related to newspaper rates suggests, however, that he is not connecting
the question of newspaper subsidies and the First Amendment.
86. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); David A. Anderson, The
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529-44 (1977). This omission evidences itself in
at least one place in Professor Leonard Levy's path-breaking and exhaustive account of the original
understanding of the First Amendment, Emergence of a Free Press (the revised and expanded edition
of Legacy of Suppression). In discussing the choice of the word "abridging" in the Senate's version of
what eventually became the free speech and press clauses of the First Amendment, Levy notes that
the drafters clearly did not mean to prohibit all laws "regulating" the freedom of speech, or of the
press, since they well understood that Congress had the power to pass copyright laws under Article I,
section 8, clause 8 (a step the same First Congress took in 1790, the year after sending the first twelve
amendments to the states for ratification). See LEVY, supra at 271. But, the phrase "the press," while
perhaps meant to include books, was obviously meant to apply to newspapers, and newspapers were
not even covered-or imagined to be covered-by copyright law in the late eighteenth century. See
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In sum, by the time of the First Congress in 1789, the ideological
transformation that underlay the American Revolution17 had its parallel
in a shift in attitudes towards the postal network. The Americans had
seen its importance as a conveyor of newspapers and believed that this
role was a link in establishing and maintaining a republican form of
government. The Post Office as a government enterprise or institution
was seen as the principal conduit through which political news would
flow, and this view of the Post Office crystallized a few years later in the
1792 Post Office Act.
3. The Post Office Act of 1792
One of the central debates leading up to the passage of the 1792 Post
Office Act-indeed, one of the principal reasons it took Congress three
years after ratification of the Constitution to pass postal legislation 8 -
involved the question of newspapers in the mail. Crucial in furthering
Benjamin Rush's educational rationale were the subsidies for the
transmission of newspapers. The debate surrounding the 1792 Post
Office Act provides a window into both the importance of the
educational rationale in establishing newspaper subsidies and the way in
which practical considerations and political expediency shaped the
manifestation of those principles into law.
The debate that led to Congress legislating postal subsidies for
newspapers into the 1792 Act focused on two issues: (i) selective versus
universal admission of newspapers; and (2) how much, if anything, to
charge for providing mail service for newspapers.
Act of Apr. 24, 18o2, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171 (repealed) (limiting copyright to "maps, charts, and
books"); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872) (holding that
newspapers are not protected by copyright); see also Neil Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, io6 YALE L.J. 283, 354-55 n.325 (1996). See generally Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History
of Anglo-American Intellectual Property, ch. III (2005) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law
School), available at http://www.obracha.net/oi/oi.htm. So, the power to promulgate copyright law is by
no means the best way to evidence the Framers' assumption that the word "abridging" does not
encompass all laws that could constitute "regulating" the press. Rather, to make Levy's point even
more clearly, the postal power found in Article I, section 8, clause 7 seems a better source. Those who
approved the First Amendment all understood that the postal power was intimately connected to "the
press" and that the federal government was going to be "regulating" the press through use of the
postal power. They also understood that the Post Office was the conduit through which newspapers
flowed.
87. My reference to the "ideological transformation" of the American revolution focuses
primarily on the question of the locus of "sovereign" power, what Gordon Wood calls "the single most
important abstraction of politics in the entire Revolutionary era." See GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 348 (1969); see also BAILYN, supra note 12, at 198. I do not
mean to imply that the changing notions of sovereignty that accompanied the Revolutionary period
were theoretically necessary for viewing the postal network as Rush and other Americans were
beginning to see it. Cf. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 49 (noting that an "informed public opinion as the
guardian of the [English] constitution" was "implicit" in the "Revolution Settlement" following the
Glorious Revolution of 1688).
88. See JOHN, supra note 8, at 31.
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a. Selective Admission of Newspapers
One of the principal disputes during the debates on newspapers in
the mails centered on a proposal made in 179o, during the First Congress,
to admit a select number of newspapers into the mails. By the late 1780s
and early 1790s the Post Office was circulating newspapers, as a general
matter, in only two circumstances. First, members of Congress enjoyed
franking privileges which they used to transmit newspapers to their
constituents, making them, in the words of historian Richard R. John,
"newsbrokers for the public at large."' Second, printers were allowed to
"exchange" one copy of their newspapers with other printers for free,
which was a way postal authorities encouraged the distribution of
nonlocal information to other papers.' Other than that, newspapers
were, as a practical matter, no longer being circulated through the mails.
The proposal to admit some newspapers to the mail would thus have
increased the flow of newspapers, thereby increasing access to
information about public affairs, while simultaneously relieving
Congressmen from the burden of having to frank. Key to the proposal
for selective admission was the fact that, in contrast to a policy of
allowing all newspapers access to the mails, selective admission would
have precluded the possibility of the postal system being overwhelmed
by newspapers. This was by no means an idle concern. From the mid-
176os until the beginning of the Revolutionary War, the handling of
newspapers in the Post Office was a serious issue straining relations
between the Colonists and the British government. As I noted earlier,
when the British commissioned a study of the North American Post
Office in November 1773, one of the author's conclusions was that
newspapers were overburdening the mails.9'
However, the underlying idea of selective admission met with intense
criticism: those who later became Republicans feared that such a policy
would be used discriminatorily and would effectively amount to a federal
subsidy for the government's supporters in the press, particularly the
Washington Administration's quasi-official paper, the Gazette of the
United States. In an era in which the Postmasters General had significant
partisan connections, these future Republicans worried that selective
admission would provide the government with a tool for propaganda.
Given the history of the British Post Office as a vehicle for promoting the
Crown and the problems that anti-federalists had had with the Post
89. Id. at 32.
go. This practice dated back to the early eighteenth century, and was first codified by Benjamin
Franklin and William Hunter, the two Deputy Postmasters-General, in 1758. KIELaowIcz, supra note
26, at is. It was perhaps no coincidence that both Franklin and Hunter were themselves newspaper
publishers. By the 178OS, this exchange privilege was discretionary, and postriders were permitted to
leave exchange papers behind if their saddlebags were too heavy.
91. See text accompanying note 32.
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Office during the debates on the ratification of the Constitution,92 this too
was not an idle worry.93 The policy of selective admission was defeated,
and the First Congress ended without addressing the question of
newspapers in the mail. The stopgap postal law that was enacted simply
provided that newspapers were to be admitted "under rules to be made
by the Postmaster General."'9 Though selective admission was not
written into law, the fear of a "Court Press and Court Gazette" remained
strong as long as newspaper conveyance remained within the discretion
of the Postmaster General.95
Early in the Second Congress, in March 1791, the issue of
newspapers in the mails was back on the table. There was little discussion
of selective admission, but most Congressmen still wanted the postal
statute to include an explicit policy on the propriety of newspapers in the
mail. This was now the third time Congress was addressing their power
to establish a post office (albeit only the second that touched on
substantive policy matters), and the Post Office was still operating under
the Continental Congress's 1782 Ordinances, the authority of which
Congress had extended in both 1789 and I79o. 6 Publishers on both sides
of the political divide agreed that part of the central government's role
was to promote the press, and most Congressmen likewise believed that
the federal Post Office should admit newspapers in the mails, since both
Federalists and Republicans thought that the resulting increased flow of
information would benefit them politically.' Congress thus settled on a
policy that would permit all newspaper publishers to use the mail
notwithstanding the worry that newspapers would overburden the
system.
b. Newspaper Rates
With selective admission no longer at issue, the debate turned to the
question of rates. Throughout the debate, there was one key assumption:
92. See supra note 65.
93. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1737 (1790); ELLIS, supra note 17; HANSON, supra note 72; JOHN, supra
note 8, at 34. I use the Annals of Congress as documentary support recognizing that, for the period
until March 8, 179O, the notes are unreliable because the reporter, Thomas Lloyd, was both a
notorious federalist partisan and, at that point in his life, often thoroughly inebriated. See James H.
Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L. REV. I,
36-38 (1986); Marion Tinling, Thomas Lloyd's Reports of the First Federal Congress, i8 WM. & MARY
Q. 519,520,527-28, 538 (1961).
94. The 179o Act, as had the 1789 Act before it, simply extended the authority of the Post Office
to continue under the 1782 Ordinances of the Continental Congress. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 36, x
Stat. 178 (1790) (expired 1791); Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 70 (1789) (expired 179O).
95. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 32.
96. See I Stat. at 70; id. at 178.
97. Peter Wosh, Going Postal, 6i AM. ARCHIVIST 220, 223 (1998); see also JOHN, supra note 8, at
59-63; KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 36 (noting that both Federalists and Republicans favored low
postage for newspapers); Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News in the Early
Republic, 3 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 255 (1983).
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every proposal entailed newspaper rates that were both far below those
of ordinary letters and below the actual cost of delivery. 8 Thus, everyone
viewed what were effectively federal government subsidies for
newspapers as part of the role a national postal network should play.
Though the "fiscal rationale" for the Post Office overall remained,
newspaper policy in particular was premised entirely on the "educational
rationale."
Though there was some public discussion of postage-free delivery of
newspapers," the congressional debates focused on whether the postal
rates for newspapers should be flat or graduated based on the distance
traveled."'° Those who argued for a low, flat rate were generally those
who later became Republicans who believed that the diffusion of
information would help check the Federalist government; they feared
that graduated rates would make it more difficult to disseminate
information to outlying parts of the country, where their support was
greatest.'"' Those who supported graduated rates noted that it generally
cost more to transport mail further-that is, they did make what seems to
be the obvious argument that cost of delivery should be relevant to
rates-but this argument was not pressed in the debates as much as the
fear that a flat rate would result in a competitive advantage for big city
newspapers in the north, particularly those in the "seat of Government,"
vis-A-vis their rural counterparts.' 2 Since costs of production were much
higher in smaller towns and since people bought even local newspapers
primarily for national and foreign news, most Congressmen viewed
cheap postage rates as a subsidy for big city papers to the detriment of
local publications."3 Somewhat of a compromise was reached when
Representative James Hillhouse from Connecticut proposed two rates
for newspapers, one cent for any distance less than one hundred miles
and a cent and a half for anything greater. While there was thus some
98. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 33.
99. For example, Benjamin Franklin Bache, Benjamin Franklin's grandson and the editor of the
General Advertiser (which later became the Aurora), one of the most prominent anti-federalist
newspapers, viewed postage-free delivery of newspapers as a crucial method for the government to
ensure an enlightened citizenry. JOHN, supra note 8, at 35.
too. Massachusetts Representative Elbridge Gerry advocated free delivery of newspapers, noting
the importance of free dissemination of information in preventing despotism in the future, but he did
so in the context of a debate about whether to retain the franking privilege. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG.,
supra note 93, at 289-90.
ioi. KELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 33.
102. See 2 ANNALS OF cONG., supra note 93, at 285; KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 34.
103. KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 34; Kielbowicz, supra note 97, at 258-59. Indeed, the objections
raised in 1792 to low postage rates for newspapers, that they permitted city papers to infiltrate rural
areas, persisted well into the Jacksonian period (though, by then, the fear embodied in the Jacksonians
was based less on the competitive disadvantage for rural printers and more in terms of the cultural
divide between urban and rural that marked other debates in the period). See KiELBOWICZ, supra note
26, at 57, 62.
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connection to the cost of transportation, this two-tier rate structure for
newspapers contrasted sharply with the nine different rates for letters,
which cost anywhere from six cents per sheet for a distance of less than
thirty miles to twenty-five cents per sheet to go more than 450 miles.
Moreover, it was assumed throughout the entire debate-even on
the part of those advocating graduated rates-that newspapers were not
to be charged even close to the rate charged for letters. At one point in
the debate, a few Congressmen worried that the newspaper rates were
insufficient to defray the expense incurred by the government. Yet,
Representative Hillhouse was among them, and even his proposal was
nowhere near enough to break even. As a point of comparison, a typical
four-sheet newspaper would have cost twenty-four cents for less than
thirty miles and a dollar to deliver more than 450 miles if sent by letter
rate; yet, under the 1792 Act's reduced newspaper rates, the actual rates
were one cent and a cent and a half, respectively.'"
In short, by providing reduced rates for newspapers sent to
subscribers, the 1792 Post Office Act encompassed huge subsidies for the
transmission of newspapers. Those subsidies, which were effectively
provided by letter-writers-mostly merchants-who paid the higher
letter rates,' 5 were premised on the underlying educational rationale
104. The drafters of the 1792 Act clearly understood that there was a difference between
newspapers and letters and that this difference was not simply in the use of a printing press. The
legislators recognized that the medium of a newspaper was primarily one-to-many and that the
medium of a letter was one-to-one. They also fully understood that they were writing into law what
was, in effect, a content-based distinction. They recognized that newspapers printed information about
public affairs, whether as propaganda for the government or attacks on it, and that letter-writers-
generally speaking-did not. It is worth noting that Congress debated this content-based distinction at
the same time that Virginia was in the midst of debates on the ratification of what became the federal
Bill of Rights, including of course our First Amendment. Given the exorbitant charges for letters and
the fact that the law prohibited the delivery of letters outside the Post Office, see 1792 Post Office Act,
ch. 7, § 14, 1 Stat. 232, 236 (expired 1794); Oct. 1782 Ordinance, reprinted in JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 56, at 67o-79; Mar. 1782 Ordinance, reprinted in 22
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 56, at 121-27; supra Part I.B.1, this
content-based distinction had a substantial impact on those whose content was effectively disfavored,
i.e. letter-writers. One might even see the postal subsidies for newspapers as the first example of
Congress favoring political over commercial speech, since most letter-writers were merchants sending
market information. See JOHN, supra note 8, at 157-58. This distinction between "public" and
"commercial" information remained a crucial part of postal subsidies throughout American history.
See Richard B. Kielbowicz, Origins of the Second-Class Mail Category and the Business of
Policymaking, 1863-1879, 96 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS i, 13-14 (1986) [hereinafter Kielbowicz,
Origins] (noting that one of the motivations for passage of the 1879 Act establishing the four classes of
mail was to eliminate advertisers' usage of subsidized rates for periodicals); Richard B. Kielbowicz,
Postal Subsidies for the Press and the Business of Mass Culture, i88o-192o, 64 Bus. HIsT. REV. 451, 464
(199o) (describing policy debates about postal subsidies at the turn of the twentieth century involving
attempts to "distinguish between ... periodicals ... providing public information with some
advertising and those providing advertising with some public information"); id. at 477 (discussing the
passage of a 1917 law that restructured the second-class rate to tie periodicals' rates to the amount of
advertising content in a publication).
1O5. These subsidies were by no means trivial in actual impact. In 1794, only 3% of postal revenue
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espoused by Rush, Washington, Madison, Jefferson, and others: if the
"people" are to be sovereign, it is vital that they be informed about
public affairs, and it is part of the government's affirmative responsibility
to ensure that the people can in fact secure access to such information.
Providing a communications network to transmit that information was of
course only one way to do this. But, through this means, the federal
government created, as historian Richard R. John has put it, a "national
market for information sixty years before a comparable national market
would emerge for goods."' Moreover, it was an information market with
a nationalizing tendency because it "link[ed] together the far-flung
population of the United States."'"
This development, culminating with the embedding of newspaper
subsidies into the law regulating the Post Office, had a profound impact
on the First Amendment. As I argue in Part II.A, our modern notion of
First Amendment restrictions on government spending began with the
Court's recognition of constitutional limits on the allocation of postal
subsidies for the press.
In the following Part, I turn to a second important characteristic of
the early Post Office, its monopoly on long distance communication. As
with postal subsidies for the press, the postal monopoly was established
in the early years of the Post Office, and it too had a role in shaping the
modern First Amendment.
B. THE POST OFFICE'S LEGAL AND PRACTICAL MONOPOLY
Two different types of policies contributed to the Post Office's
monopoly on long distance communication. The first is the most obvious.
From the beginning, the American Post Office was a legal monopoly; the
law prohibited the delivery of letters outside of the government Post
Office. The second is less obvious, but no less important for these
purposes: over time, the legal monopoly was strengthened as a monopoly
in practice by a whole host of other factors. One of those factors was a
seed planted by the drafters of the 1792 Act. When Congress passed that
statute, it rejected attempts to delegate the power to designate postal
routes to the Executive, instead retaining that power for itself, and by
doing so created the most ubiquitous communications network in the
came from newspapers, while 70% of the weight was newspapers. JOHN, supra note 8, at 38. By 1832,
postal revenue from newspapers had increased to 15%, but the weight had increased to 95%. Id.
Io6. Id. at 37.
io7. Id. at 13; see also KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 50 ("News in the mail.., played a substantial
part in sustaining the republic through a period of fragile national unity."). It is worth further noting
that, by creating a national market for information, postal policy also "fostered the growth of
communities of interest that operated outside of traditional geographic boundaries." Peter J. Wosh,
supra note 97, at 224-25. This is of course precisely what the Internet is both lauded and criticized for.
Compare CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.cOM 51-62, 71-75 (2OO), with Chris Anderson, The Long Tail,
WIRED 12.10 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12. io/tail.html.
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world. Together, these policies helped establish what Justice Holmes
later would call the "practical dependence of the public upon the [P]ost
[O]ffice."' As I argue in Part LI.B, this functional monopoly became an
institutional characteristic of the Post Office that shaped the modern
First Amendment.
i. Legal Monopoly
From the beginning of the republic, federal law has provided the
American Post Office with a monopoly over the delivery of "letters." In
this subpart, I briefly describe the way in which the American Post Office
acquired its monopoly. This brief survey demonstrates the way in which
federal law consciously incorporated the monopoly into the structure of
the American Post Office as an institution. As Professor George Priest
has put it, "The tradition of government-managed postal monopoly is
deep-laid in the United States."'" Understanding the fact of that
monopoly and its origins is, as I argue in Part II.B, crucial for
understanding the origins of one of the most important tenets of the
modem First Amendment: the "right to receive ideas."
As I described at the beginning of Part I.A.i, the British Post Office
was a monopoly, and this attribute was key to one of its underlying
purposes: making money for the Crown. When the Continental Congress
took over William Goddard's network in 1775 to become the American
Post Office, " ' it followed in the British tradition. Although the initial
establishment of the American Post Office did not indicate that it was to
be a monopoly, in part because the colonial Post Office was still in
operation (albeit on its last legs),' the Continental Congress soon
thereafter explicitly gave itself a monopoly over postal delivery. The
Articles of Confederation, the relevant portions of which were drafted in
1776, gave the Congress the "sole and exclusive right [of] ... establishing
and regulating post offices from one State to another throughout all the
United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through
the same as may be requisite to defray the expences [sic] of the said
office ..... Although the power to establish a monopoly was limited to
io8. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
io9. See Priest, supra note 13, at 33.
Ito. See supra text accompanying notes 36-59.
I I1. See supra text accompanying note 53; see also ROGERS, supra note 49 (noting that in July 1775
when Continental Congress took over Goddard's postal network, it was not meant to be a monopoly).
112. Articles of Confederation, art. IX (Nov. 15, 1777), reprinted in 9 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 59, at 919; accord Second Draft of Articles of
Confederation, art. XIV (Aug. 20, 1776), reprinted in 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774-1789, supra note 59, at 674, 681-82 (same, albeit with some letter-case differences). If we trace
the drafting of the Articles, it is clear that a postal power of some sort was envisioned right from the
very beginning, but that the Continental Congress's assertion of a monopoly power occurred
somewhere between 1775 and 1776. The first relevant draft of a proposed document establishing a
confederation was Benjamin Franklin's, penned in 1775. See Franklin's Articles of Confederation (July
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interstate communication, the postal power was thus among the exclusive
powers the Congress gave itself. Exercising that power, the Continental
Congress promulgated the 1782 postal ordinance (the relevant portion of
which was drafted as early as 1776),"3 and in so doing, explicitly
established the postal monopoly as a legal matter.'14
21, 1775), reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 59, at 195-99.
Franklin's draft simply provided for a postal power without any monopoly provision. See id. art. V, at
196 ("The Congress shall ... make such general Ordinances as tho' necessary to the General Welfare,
particular Assemblies cannot be competent to: viz. those that may relate ... to the Establishment of
Posts ...."). In June 1776, nearly a year later, Congress appointed a committee to draft proposed
Articles, and though the draft differs significantly from Franklin's draft, it is clear that the committee
members had access to Franklin's draft because "[sleveral passages from Franklin's plan can be found
verbatim in the [committee's] drafts, and many others survive with only slight variations." See JENSEN,
supra note 68, at 126; Commentary on the Dickinson Committee Drafts (June 17, 1776), in 4 LETTERS
OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 252 (Paul H. Smith et al. eds., 1776) ("[T]here can be no
doubt that the members of the committee began their work with a copy of [Franklin's draft]."). (Note:
I am ignoring Silas Deane's proposal for a confederation and what historians refer to as the
Connecticut Plan, because the language of these two drafts was never incorporated into the Dickinson
draft which formed the basis of the final version of the Articles. See generally JACK RAKOVE, THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 138
(1979).) John Dickinson of Pennsylvania did the principal drafting in that committee, and both his
original draft, prior to committee input, and the final draft produced by the committee provided that
Congress would have the "sole and exclusive Power and Right of... Establishing and Regulating Post-
Offices." See Dickinson First Draft, Art. 19, reprinted in LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-
1789, supra at 233, 242-43; accord Dickinson Committee draft, art. XVIII (July 12, 1776), reprinted in 5
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 59, at 55O-51 ("The United States
assembled shall have the sole and exclusive Right and Power of... Establishing and Regulating Post-
Offices throughout all the United Colonies, on the Lines of Communications from one Colony to
another...."). The committee presented its draft to Congress on July 12, 1776, and Congress debated
the Articles that year until August 2o and again the following year. The language of the postal power
found in the actual Articles was finalized by August 20, 1776. See Second Draft of Articles of
Confederation, art. XIV (Aug. 20, 1776), reprinted in 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774-I789, supra note 59, at 674, 681-82. As noted in the text the "sole and exclusive" language
remained from the Dickinson Committee draft presented to Congress on July 12, 1776 through to the
version adopted by Congress on November 15, 1777. It is worth noting that the committee did make
one change in Dickinson's original draft, a change that arguably had great significance years later. As
had Franklin's draft before it, Dickinson's original draft did not limit Congress's postal power to
interstate communication, but instead simply provided for the power to "establish[ ] and regulat[e]
Post-Offices throughout all the united Colonies." Dickinson Committee draft, art. XIX, reprinted in 5
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 59, at 551. In contrast, the
committee's draft and the final version both appear to contain an interstate limitation. The committee
draft limited Congress to the power and right of "establishing and regulating Post-Offices throughout
all the United Colonies, on the Lines of Communication from one Colony to another," and the final
version of the Articles likewise defines the power as that of "establishing and regulating post offices
from one State to another throughout all the United States." 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 59, at 681-82 (emphasis added). One might see this change as a
limitation on the national government's authority to establish intrastate postal communication lines.
113. Mar. 1782 Ordinance, reprinted in 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789,
supra note 56, at 123 ("[N]o person whatsoever, except the stated Post Riders in Public Service, shall
carry any Letters or Packets upon the Post Road ... upon penalty of one hundred Spanish Milled
Dollars for each offence ....").
114. An Ordinance for Regulating the Post Office of the United States of America (Oct. 18, 1782),
reprinted in 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, I774-1789, supra note 56, at 672-73 ("And
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Like the Articles of Confederation before it, the Constitution gave a
postal power to Congress, but it rates barely a mention in histories of the
Constitution's drafting. By the time of the Constitutional Convention,
the Post Office simply was not high on the drafters' list of concerns
because it was well-accepted that the national government would have a
power to continue its postal operations. The only controversy at the
Convention was whether to include a power to establish "post roads" in
addition to the power to establish post offices. That proposal was agreed
to by a vote of six to five during the Convention, and the provision was
untouched thereafter. When the Constitution was sent to the States for
ratification, again the postal power was barely noticed. The only mention
of the power in the Federalist Papers consists of Madison's single
mention in Federalist No. 42 that the power was likely to be
"harmless."" 5 The state ratifying conventions likewise ignored it almost
entirely. '
be it further ordained ... that ... no [person other than the Postmaster General... and his authorized
agents] shall have the receiving, taking up, ordering, dispatching, sending post or with speed, carrying
and delivering of any letters, packets or other despatches [sic] from any place within these United
States for hire, reward or other profit or advantage for receiving, carrying or delivering such letters or
packets respectively; and any other person or persons presuming so to do shall forfeit and pay for
every such offence, twenty dollars ... ").
115. Moreover, just to be clear, Madison is referring specifically at this point only to the power to
establish post roads, not post offices. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed. 2005)
("The power of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be a harmless power, and may, perhaps,
by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to
facilitate the intercourse between the states can be deemed unworthy of the public care."). There is
not a single reference in the entire Federalist Papers to the power to establish post offices and a
network of postal delivery. As I explain in Part II.B.2, it is difficult to understate how wrong Madison's
statement turned out to be, given how important the postal power was to become through the
nineteenth century. As Justice Story wrote in his Commentaries less than fifty years after the
Constitutional Convention,
One cannot but feel, at the present time, an inclination to smile at the guarded caution of
these expressions, and the hesitating avowal of the importance of the [postal] power. It
affords, perhaps, one of the most striking proofs, how much the growth and prosperity of
the country have outstripped the most sanguine anticipations of our most enlightened
patriots.
JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, ch. 18, § 1119 (1833). Whether Madison and
other federalists were purposely understating the importance of the postal power as part of what anti-
federalist Thomas Waite called the entire Constitution's "studied ambiguity," see Letter from Thomas
B. Wait to George Thatcher (Jan. 8, 1788), in JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ATIEOERALIST: CRITICS OF
THE CONSTITUTION, 1781-1788, at 153 (1961), remains an unanswered question, but Chief Justice
Marshall was of course far less circumspect when he famously used a broad-and, by then, well-
accepted- understanding of the postal power to justify an expansive interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,417 (1819).
1I6. See ROGERS, supra note 49, at 25 ("In the state conventions there was practically no discussion
of the postal power. Its innocuousness was granted. Mr. Jones of New York was alone in finding a
latent aggression."). The principal concern in the state ratification debates was in fact not with the
postal power per se but rather with the power to construct post roads. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 406
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (motion to amend the postal power, so as to include language stating that
"the power of Congress to establish post-offices and post-roads is not to be construed to extend to the
laying out, making, altering, or repairing highways, in any state, without the consent of the legislature
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Interestingly, though, the language of the Constitution appears more
limited than the equivalent language in the Articles. The Constitution
only gives Congress the power "to establish Post Offices and post
Roads."...7 Therefore, although the Constitution added the power to
establish post-roads, the language in the Constitution is striking by what
is omitted from what the Articles of Confederation contained: Congress
was not given the "sole and exclusive" power; there was no power to
"regulate" those post offices and no power to "exact postage," (and thus
no mention that the power included the authority to exact as much
postage "as may be requisite to defray the expenses of such office").
Either the constitutional drafters were trying to change the power that
the Continental Congress had or someone was sloppy in the drafting.
Yet, there is no evidence of either. Indeed, as I noted earlier, the only
mention of the power in the Federalist Papers comes in Federalist No. 42,
an essay that Madison used to discuss in detail the differences between
powers in the Constitution and those in the Articles. Even there,
Madison made nothing of the stark difference in language between the
postal power in the Constitution and that found in the Articles. Despite
those significant differences in text and despite the occasional challenge,
both actual and academic," 8 there has never been a serious constitutional
attack on the postal monopoly."9 When Congress passed the 1792 Act, it
followed directly from the 1782 Ordinance and prohibited mail delivery
outside of the federal government Post Office.' ° That monopoly, though
changed in many ways, survives to this day.''
of such state").
1 I7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
II8. During the 184os and 185os, a number of private mail services arose. Christina M. Bates,
From 34 Cents to 37 Cents: the Unconstitutionality of the Postal Monopoly, 68 Mo. L. REV. 123, 137-38
(2003). The most well-known among them was Lysander Spooner's American Letter Mail Company,
which the government effectively forced out of business in less than a year. Id. The brief (illegal)
competition did in fact spur, as any economist would expect, a reduction in rates. Id. In 1845 and then
again in 1851, the Post Office reduced rates, and did so to such an extent that private mail services
were effectively priced out of the market. Id.
I59. See Priest, supra note 13, at 46; see also United States v. Kochersperger, 26 F. Cas. 803, 803
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 186o) (No. 15,541) ("No government has ever organized a system of posts without
securing to itself, to some extent, a monopoly of the carriage of letters and mailable packets. The
policy of such an exclusive system is a subject of legislative, not of judicial, inquiry."); United States v.
Hall, 26 F. Cas. 75, 77 (C.C.E.D. Pa. I844) (No. 15,281) (upholding prohibition on private delivery of
letters after concluding that there is not "such a 'clear and strong incompatibility' between the
constitution and the act of congress so construed as will authorize me to declare the act void"); United
States v. Thompson, 28 F. Cas. 97, 98 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 18oo) (No. 16,489) ("charg[ing] the jury ... that
the law in question was constitutional" in criminal case for unauthorized delivery of mail).
120. See 1792 Post Office Act, ch. 7, § 14, 1 Stat. 232, 236 (expired 1794).
121. Opponents of the monopoly in the United States will no doubt find a certain irony in the fact
that, in anticipation of the need to comply with European Union regulations, the British government
has ended the Royal Mail's monopoly on the delivery of letters in the United Kingdom. See Royal





How the "practical dependence of the public upon the [P]ost
[O]ffice," as Justice Holmes put it in 1922,2' came about is a complex
historical question. Although I cannot answer it in full here, I focus on
one important way in which early postal policymakers contributed to the
Post Office's ubiquity, a ubiquity that ultimately strengthened the
effectiveness of the legal monopoly. In my initial discussion of the
"educational rationale," I mentioned Benjamin Rush's 1787
"Address.' 23 Recall that the second of his proposals was to extend the
postal network into the interior of the country. This indeed occurred. In
the formative years of the U.S. Post Office, many different policies
together contributed to this unprecedented expansion of the postal
network, and consequently communication flows, to the far reaches of
the country.
In the remainder of this Part, I will discuss the one policy choice
that, more than any other, was responsible for this expansion. That
choice was whether Congress would retain the power to designate new
post offices and postal routes or would delegate that power to the
Executive. This seemingly trivial question was part of the early struggle
within Congress as to how much authority it would exercise over what we
would today call "administrative decisions.' 24 More importantly for my
purposes, this debate had profound implications for the growth of the
postal network.'25
On five occasions prior to the eventual passage of the 1792 Act,
Congress struggled with the question of whether Congress or the
Executive should have the authority to designate post roads and offices.
In January 1790, when Postmaster General Samuel Osgood first
proposed a comprehensive law addressing the Post Office, among the
things he recommended was a clause authorizing the Postmaster General
"[t]o establish and open new Post Offices and new post roads, whenever
and wherever they may be found necessary, within certain limits marked
out by the acts of Congress.''116 Early in discussion of the proposed bill,
122. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 14i (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123. See supra text accompanying note 69.
124. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 77 (1948).
Professor Currie has recounted some of the details of this debate in his work on the Constitution in
Congress. See Currie, supra note 85, at 628-32; accord Jerry Mashaw, Recovering American
Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, i787-i8oi, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1293-96 (2oo6).
125. Though the Congressional policy debates did not manifest much indication of the huge impact
that was to result, many at the time may have understood that Congressional control over route
designation would in fact likely result in an expansion of the network to the south and west. See John
& Young, supra note 37, at 128, 132 (noting that the expansion was "a product less of happenstance
than of deliberate design").
126. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: POST OFFICE 7 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834). This
was in keeping with the basic policy in place at the time, which was to have the Postmaster General
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the House eliminated that provision, arguing that it violated the
Constitution because the "power was vested in Congress by an express
clause in the Constitution, and therefore cannot be delegated to any
person.'1 7 When the House Committee that drafted the next iteration
presented it to the whole House two months later, the bill included a list
of particular routes by which the mail was to be carried. 2s It was then
that Representative Theodore Sedgwick, a Congressman from
Massachusetts who was later affiliated with the Federalists,' 9 moved to
replace that section with a clause authorizing the Postmaster General to
establish the post roads, in essence returning to Osgood's proposal.'3 °
Besides the question of the constitutionality of such a delegation, those
who opposed Sedgwick's motion argued that Congress was more
competent to designate the post roads because congressmen knew the
relevant geographical areas better than did the Postmaster General.'3 '
Representative Sedgwick's motion was defeated "by a great majority.' 3.
Once again, a month later, when the bill came back to the House from
the Senate with a proposal for an amendment similar to Sedgwick's, the
House again debated the proposal.'33 The same debate returned in the
following session of the First Congress, this time with Representative
John Steele from North Carolina, also later a Federalist, proposing the
language to delegate power to the President.'34 With Congress unable to
resolve this issue, no statute passed.'35 This struggle was one of the
principal reasons Congress failed to pass substantive postal legislation in
the First Congress.
I6
When the Second Congress addressed postal issues, authority to
designate routes again came to the fore. The key debate took place on
choose postal routes that crossed state lines and to have local postmasters choose intra-state routes.
See John & Young, supra note 37, at 122.
127. 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 93, at 1579.
128. See id. at 1697.
129. Sedgwick was later Speaker of the House and then a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. See RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THEODORE SEDGWICK, FEDERALIST: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT
(1965).
130. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 93, at 697.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1734-35.
134. Id. at 1936-37.
135. Id. at 194o.
136. See JOHN, supra note 8, at 46; see also, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 93, at 1937. In each
of the three sessions of the First Congress, Congress passed laws designed simply to keep postal policy
in a holding pattern pending resolution of the thorny unresolved issues. See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, 3 Stat.
218, ch. 23, § 1(I790 (expired 1792) (providing for a Postmaster General and that the regulations of
the post-office shall be the same as they last were under the resolutions and ordinances of the late
Congress but only "until the end of the next session of Congress, and no longer"); Act of Aug. 4, 1790,




December 6th and 7th, 1791, when Representative Sedgwick again
proposed his amendment to delegate the power to the President.'3 7 The
debate over these two days reads like a modern American civics lesson,
with discussion of democracy, representation, and the Constitution flying
furiously. Little changed in the attitudes of the House members,
however, and the House again rejected Sedgwick's motion. I38 The law
passed with a detailed list of post offices and post roads, and the power
to designate them remained in Congress's hands.
Beyond the inter-branch power struggle that the debate represented,
the resulting defeat of Sedgwick's motion had important practical
implications for the Post Office. By leaving the power to designate routes
in Congress's hands, the 1792 Act set the country on a course of rapid
expansion of the Post Office. More importantly, it encouraged
geographic extension of the Post Office throughout the country, in
particular the transappalachian West. By leaving the authority in
Congress's hands, the 1792 Act helped change the assumption, prevalent
in Great Britain and continental Europe at the time, that each postal
route had to be self-supporting. That assumption had to be abandoned as
the power to designate post offices and post roads became the first
opportunity to dispense what we would today call congressional pork. In
essence, the structure of the House ensured that the postal network
would expand on the basis of population rather than commercial need
since a post road and Post Office was something tangible that every
federal Representative could bring his constituents.'39 In short, the 1792
Act established a new baseline that eliminated profitability of the route
as the principal criterion for determining whether to establish a new
route.4 °
The impact over the next half-century of this two-day debate over
the Sedgwick amendment was dramatic. In 1790, the United States had
one post office for every 52,000 inhabitants and a total of 1875 miles of
137. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 93, at 229.
138. Id. at 241.
139. JOHN, supra note 8, at 49; Priest, supra note 13, at 54 ("Obtaining a new postal route became
an expected perquisite, a simple means for any Congressman to endear himself to his constituents.").
140. Given the history of the Post Office as a British institution, profitability had previously been
important, including at the level of individual routes. Indeed, in the 178os, most of the "cross-posts"
(i.e., those that provided service to towns in the interior of the country) were run privately by
contractors who were given seven-year regulated-rate monopolies on a particular route, with the
proviso that they would take whatever profits or losses the route generated. See RICH, supra note 17, at
62. This system eliminated the government's risk of a financial loss. Id. Further supporting this point,
as recently as 1782, the Postmaster General had proposed an explicit provision requiring the
discontinuance of money-losing routes. See Mar. 1782 Draft Ordinance, reprinted in 22 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 56, at 122. The provision was not included in the
final version of the Ordinance that eventually passed. See An Ordinance for Regulating the Post
Office of the United States of America (Oct. 18, 1782), reprinted in 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 56, at 67o-78.
[Vol. 58:671
THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATUTES
post roads. 4' By 1815, there was one post office for every 2800 persons
and 43,966 miles of post roads.' 2 The well-known fact that many of these
routes, particularly in the South and the West, were losing money was a
direct consequence of Congress's rejection of the Sedgwick
amendment.'43 Indeed, Congressional control over postal routes resulted
in a level of detail in postal legislation unmatched in federal law at the
time. For example, one federal law was so specific that it mandated that a
new postal route in North Carolina pass by the house of either John
Anders or William H. Beaty.'" In short, decentralization of the principal
communication network of the early nineteenth century resulted in part
from a decision about the allocation of power between the executive and
the legislature.
Perhaps the easiest way to see the importance of the 1792 Act to the
geographical growth of the postal network is to compare the American
development with that in other countries. As historian Richard R. John
has pointed out, remote areas in both Great Britain and France-highly
advanced countries with far more developed economies-were not
nearly as well served as in the United States. By 1828, for example, the
American postal system had twice the number of offices as found in
Britain and more than five times the number in France. On a per capita
basis, the United States had seventy-four post offices for every one
hundred thousand inhabitants, while Britain had seventeen and France
had four.'
45
In sum, the legal monopoly was augmented by a seemingly unrelated
policy choice, one that embedded the Post Office into the social fabric of
virtually every American community. Together, these early policy
choices set the Post Office on a course towards which, as a practical
matter, "habit and law combine[d] to exclude every other" means of
long-distance communication. 46 This result, as we will see in Part II,
141. KIELBOWlCZ, supra note 26, at 46. These numbers probably include Native Americans and
blacks since Richard R. John provides figures that are somewhat different, and his exclude those two
populations. See JOHN, supra note 8, at 51. The total number of post offices rose from seventy-five in
1790 to 4500 in 182o and then to 13,4 6 8 in 184o.
142. KIELBOWICZ, supra note 26, at 46.
143. See JOHN, supra note 8, at 49. This assumption was so well-entrenched that in 1844 when
Congress revamped postal laws, partly to counter the threats from private delivery services, "Congress
unanimously believed that the government had a duty to provide postal service to non-paying frontier
and rural areas." Priest, supra note 13, at 65. Congressional authority over postal routes was finally
abandoned in 1884. See John & Young, supra note 37, at 121.
144. Act of Apr. 23, 18oo, ch. 32, 2 Stat. 42,43 (t8oo) (obsolete); accord John & Young, supra note
37, at I31. The reader can be forgiven for not having the foggiest idea who Anders or Beaty were. It
seems likely that their only importance lay in their close friendship with a Congressman at the time.
145. JOHN, supra note 8, at 5, 51-52; John & Young, supra note 37, at 133.
146. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Of course, in a literal sense,
Justice Holmes was far more wrong in 1922 than he would have been earlier. The telegraph and
telephone were both available, and even the "wireless" (i.e., radio) was in its infancy in 1922.
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impacted the modern First Amendment profoundly, by creating the
conditions necessary for the Court to establish a right to receive ideas.
II. EMBEDDING THE POST OFFICE'S INSTITUTIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS INTO THE CONSTITUTION
In Part I, I gave a history of the formation of the American Post
Office with a focus on two specific clusters of policies that shaped the
Post Office as a national communications network. Over time, both-
subsidization of newspaper delivery, and the legal and functional
monopoly over long-distance communication throughout the country-
became institutional characteristics of the Post Office. In this Part, I turn
to the way in which the Supreme Court recognized these institutional
characteristics in the early formation of First Amendment doctrine.
In Part II.A, I describe the way in which the Court effectively
incorporated postal subsidies for the press into constitutional law. In two
cases in the first half of the twentieth century, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of denying subsidized postal rates to a periodical based
on its content. When the Court in 1946 rejected the Postmaster General's
attempt to deny subsidized rates to the men's magazine Esquire because
of its sexually explicit content, the Court constitutionalized what we
might call the "network neutrality" characteristic of the early postal
subsidies. As I explained in Part I.A, early postal policymakers allocated
subsidies in a neutral way, and this choice eventually, in the Esquire case,
became a constitutional mandate. Statutory law effectively became
constitutional law, and the fact that the early statutes had embedded the
principle into the legal fabric of the Post Office was crucial to that
process.
In Part II.B, I turn to the fact that the Post Office was a monopoly
provider for long distance communication, the institutional characteristic
I described in Part I.B. In contrast to the principle of neutrality of postal
subsidization, the Court never explicitly constitutionalized the
government postal monopoly. The postal monopoly did, however, play a
crucial role in the 1965 case Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Court's
first opinion holding that the Constitution protects a "right to receive
ideas." As we will see, the principle of a "right to receive ideas" had to
be tied not only to a communications medium that embodied a form of
"network neutrality," but also to one with monopoly characteristics.
Thus, the existence of the postal monopoly-a creation of legislation, not
the Constitution-enabled the Court to put the principle of a "right to
receive ideas" into the First Amendment.
Before discussing the details of the origins of these two doctrines, I
should clarify what I am not saying. Although I do argue that the Post
Office's characteristics were embedded into the fabric of constitutional
doctrine, I am not arguing that we would not have these two doctrines
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today without their origins in postal policy. First Amendment issues
raised by government spending were bound to arise as a direct result of
government's increased role in the economy, and claims based on some
variation of a "right to receive" were intertwined with the ideas of the
most prominent First Amendment theorist of the post-war era,
Alexander Meiklejohn, from as early as the late 1940S with the
publication of his seminal book Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government.'47 It is clear, however, that it was the Court's understanding
of the Post Office-an understanding shaped by the Post Office's
historical development-that effected those doctrines in the first place.
A. CONSTITUTIONALIZING POSTAL SUBSIDIES FOR PERIODICALS: THE
MILWAUKEE LEADER CASE AND HANNEGAN V. ESQUIRE
One of the most important First Amendment questions faced by the
courts in the past twenty years is the issue of First Amendment restraints
on government when it acts as an allocator of resources. 48 This broader
question plays itself out most clearly in exercises of the government's
spending power. The federal government now racks up annual budgets
of well over a trillion dollars.9 With such huge numbers, the government
can now impact speech and the press far more easily through spending
than it can as a direct regulator of behavior, whether through the
criminal law or otherwise. The doctrine that has developed to address
First Amendment constraints on government spending is known as the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.5 ' Under this doctrine, "the
government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
147. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (948). I am
indebted to Vince Blasi for this point. For background about the writing and publication of, and an in-
depth description of the contemporary reaction to the book, see ADAM NELSON, EDUCATION AND
DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, 1872-1964, at 263-95 (2oo1).
148. OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996).
149. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Bush Budget Plan for $2.77 Trillion Stresses Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2oo6, at AI.
150. The phrase "unconstitutional conditions" long predates the modem First Amendment and
originally referred, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to state laws that conditioned the
right to do business on the relinquishing of due process rights. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 1, 51 (i910) (White, J., concurring); id. at 54-55 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Doyle v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Even today, the phrase is not limited to First
Amendment constraints on government spending, and refers to the broader concept of government
conditions on funding that might violate any constitutional provision. See Mitchell N. Berman,
Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, go GEO. L.J. i, 5 n.2o
(2001) (collecting sources on "unconstitutional conditions"); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415-17 (1989). Scholars who want to describe the
phenomenon-as opposed to the doctrine-as it is limited to the First Amendment context have used
phrases like "subsidized speech," or "government subsidies and free expression." See Robert C. Post,
Subsidized Speech, io6 YALE L.J. 151 (1996); Martin Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies
and Free Expression, 8o MINN. L. REV. 543 (995). The courts, however, have consistently referred to
the problem as one of "unconstitutional conditions." See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539
U.S. 194, 210-II (2003); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1990.
March 20071
HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL
his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech' even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit."' 5 '
The Court has struggled mightily with the abstract problem of
whether, and if so when, it should invalidate exercises of government
spending that might detrimentally impact free speech and press rights.'52
Indeed, the problem has so bedeviled the Court that in its most recent
encounter with the question, it completely reframed the case so as to
avoid dealing with the issue of government spending.'53 The doctrine
remains a muddle, probably in part because of changes in the Court's
membership but also because of a broader conceptual confusion about
what it might mean for government spending to "abridge" free speech
rights.
Justice Scalia is probably the most well-known proponent of what
must be the simplest approach to the problem: deny that any exercise of
government spending can "abridge" freedom of speech.'54 Such an
approach clearly has a superficial appeal and eliminates many of the
difficulties associated with the problem, but it has made little headway as
actual doctrine. A diametrically opposite approach, to treat conditions
on government funding as the equivalent of penalties for the exercise of
First Amendment rights, thereby importing ordinary First Amendment
principles such as "viewpoint discrimination," also has its adherents.'55
This approach, too, has had little success in garnering a Court majority.
The confusion has multiplied many times over since government
spending can be viewed as a subset of government acting as an allocator
of resources in general, thereby conflating the government spending
question with government as property owner (the "public forum"
doctrine) or employer (the so-called Pickering "public concern" test).
We might think, for example, of Justice Holmes's famous quip that a
person "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman" as either limited to the context of
government employment or as a broader point about the power of
government to condition its allocative powers (here the power to allocate
its own employment) on the waiver of constitutional rights.' Not
151. Bd. of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (996) (quoting Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
152. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194; Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2001); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (i998); Rust, 500 U.S. 173.
153. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1297, 1307
(2006).
154. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Finley, 524 U.S. at 6ol (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
156. See McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). Of course, whether one sees it
in narrow or broad terms, Justice Holmes's conclusion here is simply a form of the argument made by
Justice Scalia in cases involving government as allocator. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 595-96 (Scalia, J.,
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surprisingly, then, the Court's doctrine remains a mess,'5 7 though the
Court has generally been extremely accommodating when the
government has used funding in ways that affect speech and the press. '
Given this confusion, it should come as no surprise that scholars
have attempted to make some sense of the chaos, and, indeed, those who
have addressed the issue are among the most distinguished constitutional
theorists of our day.'59 At this point, a scholar would have to have an
unremitting faith in his/her own intellect or be relatively unread (or
both) to venture a new theoretical approach to the normative questions
raised by government spending and freedom of speech.
While scholars have struggled with these normative questions, the
historical origins of the doctrine in the First Amendment context remain
unexplored. In this Part, I intend to fill that gap. My claim here is purely
descriptive. When the Court first ruled that an exercise of government
spending violated the First Amendment, it did so by simply enforcing
longstanding postal policy against a government attempt to undo that
historical legacy. The Court simply constitutionalized the century-and-a-
half old legislative policy of postal subsidies for the press that had been
embedded into the institutional structure of the Post Office. It is
certainly the case that the Court had normative reasons for its holding,
but as we will see its normative framework was premised on a conception
of the institutional role that a postal network should play in the free flow
of information, not on any abstract theory about the relationship
between government spending and free speech.' 6° One might see the
longstanding postal policy that the Court constitutionalized as a
paradigmatic example of a historical "baseline," as Professor Seth
Kreimer has put it, against which the constitutionality of an exercise of
dissenting).
157. For a summary of the doctrine, see EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED
STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 400-01 (2d ed. 2005).
158. Except where the Court saw discrimination against religion, see Rosenberger v. Rector, 515
U.S. 819, 822-23, 837 (1995), the only case in the past twenty years to invalidate an exercise of the
government spending power on First Amendment grounds is Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533 (2OO1). But cf. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194; Finley, 524 U.S. 569; Rust, 500 U.S. 173.
159. Fiss, supra note 148, at 27-49; Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 1007 (1995);
Kreimer, supra note 85 passim; Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593
(199o); Post, supra note 15o, at 151; Redish & Kessler, supra note 15o; Frederick Schauer, Too Hard:
Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENVER U. L. REV. 989
(0995); Sullivan, supra note 15o. As Professor Berman has put it, albeit referring to the broader
"unconstitutional conditions" question, "Anything approaching a comprehensive list of this
voluminous literature would consume pages." Berman, supra note 15o, at 5 n.20.
16o. Cf. Post, supra note 15o, at 194 ("[T]he doctrines of unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint
discrimination are incoherent because they are excessively abstract and formal, detached from the
actual levers of decision.").
161. Kreimer, supra note 85, at 1359-63. Kreimer does not explicitly use second-class mailing rates
as an example, though he does briefly cite to Justice Holmes's dissents in Leach v. Carlile and the
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government spending was judged.
6
,
Let me turn, then, to the Court's earliest foray into the "subsidized
speech" problem, two cases in the first half of the twentieth century
involving what is known as the second-class mailing category. Second-
class rates are far below those of any other category of mail and, like the
early newspaper subsidies, are far below the cost of delivery. They are, in
short, government subsidies for the circulation of certain types of postal
material.
As I explained in Part I.A, the early newspaper subsidies
represented an ideological shift from the Post Office as a government
mouthpiece to the Post Office as a neutral conduit through which all
newspaper publishers, including those opposing the government, could
communicate. This shift marked the Post Office as an institution in a way
that reverberates to this day. The Court's eventual answer to the
"subsidized speech" question turned not on abstract First Amendment
principles such as content or viewpoint neutrality, but rather on the
Court's understanding of a very specific aspect of the Post Office's
institutional structure: the legacy of the early postal policymakers'
decision to subsidize newspapers.
Two cases that address this question, the World War I era
Milwaukee Leader case' 63 and the post World War II case Hannegan v.
Esquire,'64 answered it in very different ways. Both cases involved actions
taken by the Postmaster General under the Classification Act of 1879,
the law that created the four classes of postage and prescribed the
eligibility criteria for each class of mail. 6' In the Milwaukee Leader case,
the Court held that second-class rates were a "privilege" and that "the
power to suspend or revoke such second-class privilege was a necessary
incident to the power to grant it."' 66 The Esquire Court, in contrast,
characterized a denial of second-class rates as "censorship" and went so
far as to say that "grave constitutional questions are immediately raised"
by giving the Postmaster General the right to deny a publication the
Milwaukee Leader case. See id. at 1262.
162. Let me emphasize again that I am not making a normative argument. Professor Kreimer's
trilogy of "baselines" has been subjected to a whole host of criticisms as normative criteria for
determining when to invalidate an exercise of the spending power. To borrow Professor Kenneth
Simons's terms, I am not getting an "ought" from an "is." Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and
Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 289,310 (1989).
163. U.S. ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Dem. Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). Most scholars
have used "Burleson" as the short form for the case. I refer to the case as the "Milwaukee Leader"
case in part to remind the reader of the fact that the case involved a newspaper. I am comforted in my
choice by the fact that scholars as distinguished as Zechariah Chafee and David Rabban both refer to
the case in the same way. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATONS 296, 298,
307 (1947); DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTrEN YEARS 152 (997).
164. 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
165. Id. at 147-50; Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 410-12.
166. 255 U.S. at 410.
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second-class rates as long as the publication was of the general format
and type eligible for those rates.'6 7 The Court's move from the Milwaukee
Leader case in 1921 to Esquire in 1946 was a shift towards a Court that
recognized the subsidies as an embedded institutional characteristic. The
First Amendment itself had traveled a long way in that period,' 6 and we
see that development reflected in the Esquire case. A comparison of the
rhetoric of the Milwaukee Leader case with that of Esquire shows a
different attitude towards the actions being challenged, not a change in
the social meaning of the Post Office or of the second-class rate category.
In short, the Esquire Court incorporated into the First Amendment a
long-standing institutional attribute of the Post Office, while the
Milwaukee Leader Court did not.'
69
The Milwaukee Leader case involved a challenge to a Postmaster
General order denying second-class mailing status to the Leader, a
prominent socialist newspaper published and edited by Victor Berger.'7 °
After a hearing, the Postmaster General determined that several articles
published in the Leader violated the Espionage Act, rendering the paper
"nonmailable" under a separate provision in the statute.'7' The
Postmaster General then revoked the Leader's second-class status on the
grounds that, because the paper was not mailable matter under the
Espionage Act, it was thus "not a 'newspaper or other periodical
167. 327 U.S. at 153.
168. See generally G. Edward White, Free Speech and the Bifurcated Review Project: The
"Preferred Position" Cases, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE: WRITING THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 99 (Sandra F. VanBurkleo et al. eds., 2002); G. Edward White, The First
Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 299 (1996).
169. The Court had addressed the constitutionality of the Classification Act once before the
Milwaukee Leader case. In the 1913 case Lewis Publishing v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 313 (1913), the
Court upheld the Newspaper Publicity Act, a statute that conditioned the subsidized second-class rates
on the requirement that publishers provide the Post Office with details of the periodical's ownership.
For a discussion of the Newspaper Publicity Act and the Lewis Publishing case, see LINDA LAWSON,
TRUTH IN PUBLISHING: FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PRESS'S BUSINESS PRACTICES, 1880-1920, at 85-9o,
147 993).
170. 255 U.S. at 408. In addition to his life as a prominent socialist newspaperman, Berger served
as a Congressman from Milwaukee. WISCONSIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY, DICTIONARY OF WISCONSIN
HISTORY (2003), available at http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/dictionary/ (search "by Keyword" for
"Victor Berger"; then follow "Berger, Victor Louis" hyperlink). In 191o, he became the first member
of the Socialist party ever elected to Congress, serving from 1911 to 1913. Id. In February 1918, he was
indicted under the criminal provisions of the Espionage Act. Id. Later that year, Milwaukee voters
elected to send him back to Congress, but Congress refused to seat him. Id. In January 1959, he was
convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Id. While his case was on appeal, he was re-elected
to Congress in December i919 in a special election. Id. Congress again refused to seat him. Id. In
January 1921, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge failed to
recuse himself in compliance with a statute that required him to do so. See Berger v. United States, 255
U.S. 22, 36 (1921). Berger was then elected to Congress again in 1922 and served from 1923 to 1929.
WISCONSIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY, supra.
171. Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 408-09.
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publication' within the meaning of the law governing mailable matter of
the second class.'
7
In most histories of the modern First Amendment, the Milwaukee
Leader case is treated as a footnote of sorts. 73 Decided in 1921, it is often
seen as simply following in the wake of the more well-known Espionage
Act cases from I919. I7' Like Abrams v. United States,' 75 Justice Clarke
wrote the majority opinion and, like Abrams, Justices Brandeis and
Holmes dissented. 76 Seen in this light, the Milwaukee Leader case is
simply one in a string of post-Abrams cases in which Justices Holmes and
Brandeis stake out the "enlightened" First Amendment position that the
Court eventually adopted.
But the Milwaukee Leader case is something more and, in many
ways, something completely different. Unlike the earlier Espionage Act
cases, the Milwaukee Leader case is better seen as an early
"unconstitutional conditions" or "subsidized speech" case. I" It is the first
case in which a Supreme Court Justice voted to invalidate a use of
federal spending on First Amendment grounds.17 Moreover, it is not
simply a First Amendment case in the sense of Abrams and the earlier
Espionage Act cases.'79 It is instead a case about the unique First
172. Id. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Left, The Right and the First Amendment.- 1918-1928, 40 MD.
L. REV. 349, 374-75 (I98i) (referring to Justice Brandeis's dissent in the case as part of a list of his
opinions applying the "clear and present danger" test); Howard Owen Hunter, Problems in Search of
Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59, 113-16
(1986).
174. Here I am referring to the trilogy of Espionage Act cases decided in March i919, Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (i19); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (i919); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (i919); and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (I919), decided in November of the
same year.
175. 250 U.S. 616.
176. Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 417,436 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
177. See G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence:
The Human Dimension, 8o CAL. L. REv. 391 , 443-44 (1992) (comparing Justice Holmes's dissent in the
Milwaukee Leader case with his 1892 opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(Mass. 1892), in which Holmes famously noted that a man "may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman").
178. The first case in which the Court addressed whether federal spending violated the First
Amendment also involved the Post Office. In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), and a few other
cases over the following quarter-century, the Court addressed the constitutionality of statutes that
created categories of unmailable matter based on content. While strictly speaking these cases did not
explicitly involve spending, they were resolved on the grounds that the Post Office is a government
operation and the government had no obligation to "assist" in the circulation of materials that it found
objectionable. See, e.g., id. at 736-37.
179. Here I am referring solely to cases in the United States Supreme Court. Judge Hand's now-
famous exposition of the "direct incitement" test in 1917 also involved the Post Office; in that case,
Judge Hand granted the publisher of The Masses an injunction preventing the Postmaster from barring
certain issues of the paper from the mails, interpreting the Espionage Act narrowly in light of First
Amendment principles not to cover what the Postmaster sought to bar. See Masses Publ'g Co. v.
Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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Amendment institution of the Post Office.
The Supreme Court rejected Berger's constitutional challenge to the
Postmaster General's action. Justice Clarke's opinion for the majority
noted that the Court had already upheld the constitutionality of the
Espionage Act two years earlier and then framed the question as simply
whether "substantial evidence" existed to support the Postmaster
General's order.'O The Court gave some examples of articles the paper
had published and agreed that they violated the Espionage Act.' The
Court then concluded, "When, for more than five months, a paper had
contained, almost daily, articles which, under the express terms of the
statute, rendered it 'non-mailable,' it was reasonable to conclude that it
would continue its disloyal publications ....,,,82 Adding one final point,
the Court implied that the Postmaster General was being gracious to
simply revoke the paper's second-class status rather than deny the paper
use of the mails altogether."" In essence, the Court applied the very logic
of the Postmaster General. Nonmailability implied ineligibility for
second-class rates: if the newspaper cannot be sent through the mails,
surely the Post Office need not allow it to be sent at subsidized rates.
Justice Brandeis's dissent attacked the conflation of nonmailability
with second-class mailing status. He first concluded that the power given
to the Postmaster General by the Espionage Act, like the many other
statutes establishing nonmailable matter, was limited to excluding the
particular matter that violates the Act and does not extend to "future
issues of a newspaper."' 4 Justice Brandeis then noted that the Espionage
Act and the Classification Act were two completely different statutes,
and that nothing in the Espionage Act granted the Postmaster General
power to deny second-class status to future issues of a newspaper based
on a past violation of the Espionage Act. 5 The determination of second-
class status was based solely on the Classification Act.
Having concluded that the statute did not confer upon the
Postmaster General the power he exercised, Justice Brandeis stated that
"even if the statutes were less clear in this respect" he would interpret
the statutes in that manner to avoid a "succession of constitutional
doubts." '86 Brandeis concluded that a statute that gave the Postmaster
s8o. Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 413; accord Theodore Kadin, Administrative Censorship: A
Study of the Mails, Motion Pictures and Radio Broadcasting, i9 B.U. L. REV. 533, 546-47 (I939); Reuel
E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First
Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2000).
181. Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 413-14.
182. Id. at 46.
183. Id. ("The order simply withdrew from [Berger] the second-class privilege, but did not exclude
its paper from other classes, as it might have done ... .
184. Id. at 429 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 428-29.
186. id. (quoting Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 211 U.S. 407, 422 (19o8)); cf. Cass R.
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General such power would violate the First Amendment. 87 The
government had argued that the second-class rate was a subsidy and that
the denial of the reduced rates had nothing to do with "liberty of
circulation.""' Justice Brandeis's response was to characterize the denial
of the subsidy as a penalty or a fine:
The Government might, of course, decline altogether to distribute
newspapers; or it might decline to carry any at less than the cost of the
service; and it would not thereby abridge the freedom of the press,
since to all papers other means of transportation would be left open.
But to carry newspapers generally at a sixth of the cost of the service,
and to deny that service to one paper of the same general character,
because to the Postmaster General views therein expressed in the past
seem illegal, would prove an effective censorship and abridge seriously
freedom of expression.
'89
Notice that this argument appears at first blush to be about
discrimination in general, independent of the specifics of the Post Office.
The government is not obligated to distribute newspapers at subsidized
rates, but it cannot discriminate against a paper "of the same general
character" -what we today might call "viewpoint discrimination." The
"censorship" thus derives from the discrimination, not any particular
characteristics of the Post Office. On its face, then, the argument is
rooted in an abstract logic, not history or institutional specificity. In some
ways, then, we have a debate about the characterization of the second-
class rate subsidy at a very abstract level. In the eyes of the majority, the
power to deny the subsidy was a necessary corollary of the power not to
deliver the newspaper at all, a "greater includes the lesser" argument.'"
For Justice Brandeis, the denial of the subsidy was a penalty and the
equivalent of a sanction. 9 '
Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SuP. Cr. REV. 47, 87 (discussing the Milwaukee Leader case as an
example of Justices Brandeis and Holmes interpreting statutes narrowly to avoid constitutional
doubt).
187. Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 431. In what must have been the most extensive litany of
constitutional violations found in a single statute, Justice Brandeis concluded that giving the
Postmaster General such power would also violate virtually every provision of the Bill of Rights, and
more. See id. at 432-33 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause);
id. at 434 (Article III); id. at 434-35 (Sixth Amendment); id. at 435 (Eighth Amendment).
188. Id. at 43I.
i89. Id.
19o. Of course, such arguments remain of importance in the First Amendment. Compare Posadas
de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) ("[T]he greater
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of
casino gambling. ), with Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996) (plurality
opinion) ("Although we do not dispute the proposition that greater powers include lesser ones, we fail
to see how that syllogism requires the conclusion that the State's power to regulate commercial activity
is 'greater' than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.").
191. This debate persists today. Compare Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 539 U.S. i94, 212
(2003) (plurality opinion) (noting that Children's Internet Protection Act, which conditions funds to
public schools and libraries on their placing filters on Internet terminals, does not "'penalize' libraries
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But there is more in Justice Brandeis's dissent; it seems likely that he
was thinking about the unique attributes of the Post Office and its
relationship to the press. Consider how Justice Brandeis determined that
such discrimination would prove to be "an effective censorship." In a
footnote at the end of the portion I quoted above, he quoted Harvard
professor Zechariah Chafee's book, Freedom of Speech, for the
proposition that "'[a] newspaper editor fears being put out of business by
the administrative denial of the second-class mailing privilege much
more than the prospect of prison subject to a jury trial." '92 In other
words, denial of second-class rates should be treated as censorship due to
the actual impact of that denial in a world in which postal subsidies had
become assumed into the costs of doing business in the broader market
for periodicals.'93 As I noted in Part I.A, those subsidies had a long-
standing historical pedigree as a mechanism by which the Post Office as
an institution became a neutral, nondiscriminatory conduit for the
dissemination of news. Justice Brandeis did not rely explicitly on that
pedigree, but he did touch on reasons why viewpoint discrimination in
this particular institutional context was the equivalent of "censorship."
Justice Holmes's shorter dissent rested entirely on Justice Brandeis's
interpretation of the statutes and avoided addressing the constitutional
question altogether. Nonetheless, the opinion is noteworthy because of
Justice Holmes's famous aphorism that "[t]he United States may give up
the [P]ostoffice when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the
mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our
tongues, ' " an obvious recognition that there is something unique about
the Post Office. Like Justice Brandeis, moreover, Justice Holmes
touched briefly on the practical importance of the second-class rate: "To
refuse the second-class rate to a newspaper is to make its circulation
impossible .... ",19 Although Justice Holmes felt no need to address the
constitutional question directly, he too made clear that the case involved
the unique nature of the Post Office as a First Amendment institution.
The Holmes quotation is justifiably famous simply as a rhetorical
device,' but before I turn to the case that effectively overruled the
that choose not to install [filtering software]" but "simply reflects Congress' decision not to subsidize
their doing so"), with id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the law as penalizing libraries
that fail to use filtering technology). See also Desai, supra note 13, at 39-45.
192. Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 431 n.14 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 199 (1920)).
193. Robert Post has hypothesized that our intuitive sense that a statute that denied second-class
mailing status to "indecent" magazines would be unconstitutional is due to the fact that such a law
"would as a practical matter function to disable magazines." Post, supra note 15O, at 179. In this,
Professor Post's views appear to be consonant with those of Chafee and Brandeis.
194. Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 437 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Indeed, even the concession Justice Holmes claimed to make-that the government may give
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Milwaukee Leader case,'" I want to focus on the substance of Justice
Holmes's aphorism for a moment longer because, in some ways, it is the
perfect embodiment of the notion of an institutional First Amendment.
One way to see this is to compare the Post Office to a public educational
institution such as a university. At first blush, the two do not seem
comparable, but the premise underlying Justice Holmes's statement-
that the mere creation and maintenance of a post office entails
government responsibilities that are constrained by First Amendment
principles-is precisely what underlay some of the early seminal public
university First Amendment cases.
In his historical review of academic freedom and the First
Amendment, constitutional scholar and former President of the
American Association of University Professors, William Van Alstyne,
has noted this comparison. He points, for example, to Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence in Wieman v. Updegraff,'9 one of the earliest
Supreme Court opinions to articulate a specific vision of educational
institutions as First Amendment institutions. In Wieman, the Court
invalidated an Oklahoma law requiring all state employees to take a
broad "loyalty" oath.'" Justice Frankfurter wrote separately to
emphasize that academic freedom principles meant that the law was
particularly odious when applied to teachers." Professor Van Alstyne
points out that
Frankfurter's position in Wieman was no different with respect to
public educational institutions than ... Holmes's discussion of the Post
Office.... [T]he government may give up public education whenever it
likes, yet [may] not conduct it other than according to conditions of
academic freedom so long as it stays in the business of education."°'
Surveying a series of cases from Wieman in 1952 through the late
i96os, Van Alstyne concludes that the Court's characterization of
up the Post Office if it likes-is hardly a concession at all, since Justice Holmes knew full well that the
government could not, and would not, give up the Post Office because of its importance to the social
and economic fabric of the nation.
197. As I will discuss in further detail, the Esquire case did not literally overrule the Milwaukee
Leader case if we treat the Milwaukee Leader case as standing for the narrow proposition that second-
class status could be denied to a publication that had violated the Espionage Act (or even one that had
violated any other statute prohibiting the mailing of certain matter). See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,
GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 304 n.29 (1947) (noting that while Justice Douglas's opinion
for the Esquire Court did cite the Milwaukee Leader dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis
favorably, the opinion "was careful to confine the protection of the Esquire decision to 'mailable'
periodicals"). If, however, we see the Milwaukee Leader case instead as simply representing the broad
principle that second-class mailing status is a "privilege" that Congress and/or the Postmaster General
can withhold without constitutional constraint, the Esquire case clearly repudiated that notion.
198. 344 U.S. 183, 184 (1952).
199. id. at 183.
200. Id. at 194-95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
201. William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court
of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 109 (1990).
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educational institutions directly parallels the Post Office. "[L]ike the
post," Van Alstyne writes, "the state may give up public education when
it chooses; but while carrying it on, the state is not sole master of what
students are free to learn, whether on their own initiative or in
interaction with those free to teach."'. Justice Holmes's use of the Post
Office anticipated the Court's later approach to public educational
institutions, and thus served as the first brick in what Professor Schauer
calls an "institutional First Amendment.""
Fast forward twenty-five years from the Milwaukee Leader case to
Hannegan v. Esquire,2" where the Court considered a variation of the
question it answered in the Milwaukee Leader case: what is the role of
the Postmaster General in the scheme set forth in the Classification Act?
Esquire was another case involving statutory interpretation laced with a
First Amendment trim. Under the Classification Act, one of the
requirements for eligibility for the second-class rates was that the
periodical "be originated and published for the dissemination of
information of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences,
the arts, or some special industry."2 5 In Esquire, the Postmaster General
determined that the men's magazine, Esquire, did not satisfy that
requirement because the magazine contained matter that was "said to
reflect the smoking-room type of humor, featuring, in the main, sex.2
6
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, looked at the legislative
history of the Classification Act and concluded that the Postmaster
General lacked the power to determine that Esquire was not entitled to
second-class rates because of its sexually explicit matter.20'7 To give the
Postmaster General the power to prescribe standards for literature or art
would amount to censorship; thus, the provision would have to be
interpreted in a way that would "supply standards which relate to the
format of the publication and to the nature of its contents, but not to their
quality, worth, or value."""' In short, Congress did not give the
Postmaster General the power to decide that a particular publication was
a contribution to the public welfare.
But the Court went one step beyond statutory interpretation,
arguing that "grave constitutional questions are immediately raised once
it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege which may be extended or
202. Id. at 120.
203. See supra text accompanying note 9.
204. 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
205. Classification Act of 1879, ch. 18o, § 14, 20 Stat. 359 (current version at 39 U.S.C. § 4354
(20oo)).
206. Esquire, 327 U.S. at I5I.
207. Id. at 151-52.
208. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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withheld on any grounds whatsoever."2" Though the Court did not state
explicitly that a statute that discriminated on the basis of either content
or viewpoint in the allocation of subsidized postal rates would violate the
First Amendment, the implication was clear: giving a government official
the power to determine "[w]hat is good literature, what has educational
value, what is refined public information, [or] what is good art... smacks
of an ideology foreign to our system."..
Taken out of its institutional context of the Post Office, however,
Douglas's implication would of course be flat out wrong. We do give
certain government officials the power to determine "[wihat is good
literature, what has educational value, what is refined public information,
[and] what is good art" all the time. None of those government officials
work in the Post Office, of course. The government officials who do this
are instead state university professors, secondary and primary school
teachers, and even (to a lesser extent) librarians. These individuals are
often hired by the government precisely to make such decisions.
The Court did not say this, but it made clear in other ways that its
interpretation was made in light of an understanding about the Post
Office, an understanding that the Court saw as rooted in the origins and
history of postal subsidies. The Court emphasized that the statutory
provision "would have to be far more explicit for us to assume that
Congress made such a radical departure from our traditions ..... While
the Court's reference to "our traditions," a phrase that appears twice in
the opinion,212 likely meant to include "First Amendment traditions," the
Court clearly also meant our "post office traditions." Immediately after
stating that a power to determine eligibility for second-class rates on the
basis of the objectionable nature of a periodical's content is "so
abhorrent to our traditions that a purpose to grant it should not be easily
inferred," the Court noted that subsidized rates for "certain classes of
publications" date back to "the beginning," citing to the 1792 Post Office
Act as well as the 1863 and 1879 statutes establishing the second-class
category.1 3 Moreover, in the footnote immediately after the word
"traditions," the Court cited portions of a law review article which
exclusively discussed the relationship between the Post Office and the
First Amendment."4 In other words, the "tradition" was not simply a
209. Id. at 156. Although Justice Douglas was still speaking for the Court at this point, Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence made clear that he thought it unnecessary for the Court to address the
constitutional question. Id. at i6o (Frankfurter J., concurring). So, although the Court's decision in
Esquire was unanimous, this part of the Court's decision probably is best characterized as 8-i.
210. Id. at 157-58.
211. Id. at 156.
212. Id. at 151, 156.
213. Id. at 151. See generally Kielbowicz, Origins, supra note 104, at I.
214. See Esquire, 327 U.S. at 156 n.17 (citing Eberhard P. Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the
Mails, 36 MICH. L. REV. 703, 715-27 (1938)).
[Vo1. 58:671
THE TRANSFORMATION OFSTATUTES
tradition of freedom of expression/press, but rather a tradition of press
freedom in the specific form of postal subsidies. In what today we might
characterize as a form of "subsidized speech"2 '5 raising an
"unconstitutional conditions" question,16 the Court was making an
argument rooted in institutional specificity. "[O]ur traditions," the Court
stated, included 150 years of postal subsidies granted without reference
to the "quality, worth, or value" of a particular publication, and the First
Amendment cannot be understood without incorporating that fact into
the constitutional analysis."7
In sum, the decision of the early postal policymakers to embed
postal subsidies for news into the institutional structure of the Post
Office had a direct impact on the Court's understanding of those postal
subsidies when interpreting the First Amendment more than 150 years
later. The point is not to suggest that the Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment was correct in Esquire and incorrect in the Milwaukee
Leader case, but rather simply to say that we cannot understand these
early "unconstitutional conditions" cases without understanding the
institutional context in which the interpretation of the First Amendment
took place.
B. THE POST OFFICE'S MONOPOLY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE "RIGHT TO
RECEIVE IDEAS": LAMONT V. POSTMASTER GENERAL
In Part I.A, I focused on the way in which early postal policymakers
established subsidized rates for newspapers. Then, in Part II.A, I
explained how the constitutional principle embodied in the Holmes and
Brandeis dissents in the Milwaukee Leader case, and finally accepted by
a majority of the Court in Esquire, ultimately represented the
constitutionalizing of that policy choice.
Throughout Part II.A, though, I also touched on the Post Office's
most obvious institutional characteristic: its monopoly over long distance
communication. As I explained in Part I.B, the origins of this monopoly,
like the subsidized rates, can be found in law in the early days of the
republic, particularly the monopoly that the Continental Congress gave
to the national Post Office in the 1782 Post Office Ordinance. Moreover,
the monopoly derived not simply from the explicit legal prohibition on
the use of post roads for delivering "letters" but also from the ubiquity of
the Post Office, a ubiquity that was fostered in the unique context of
American geography by Congress's decision in the 1792 Post Office Act
to retain the authority to designate post roads rather than delegating that
authority to the Executive. It was this ubiquity, more than the law alone,
215. See Post, supra note i5o, at 151.
216. See Sullivan, supra note 15o.
217. Esquire, 327 U.S. at 152.
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that led to Holmes's oft-quoted statement in the Milwaukee Leader2 i8
case, as his dissent a year later in Leach v. Carlile makes clear."9 The
monopoly over long distance communication was both a legal and factual
reality throughout much of the nineteenth century and was still crucial
for understanding the Post Office-at least as Justice Holmes saw it-in
the early 1920S.
In this Part, I turn to the way in which the existence of a postal
monopoly shaped the modern First Amendment. In contrast to Part II.A,
where the constitutional principle was borrowed directly from the
legislative enactment, the Court did not constitutionalize the
government's monopoly over long-distance communication. What it did,
however, was just as interesting. In the now nearly forgotten but
exceedingly important case of Lamont v. Postmaster General,"' the Court
shaped an important principle of freedom-of-speech jurisprudence -the
right to receive ideas-around the fact that the Post Office was the
principal means of long distance communication.
I will explain Lamont and the jurisprudential origins of the "right to
receive ideas" below and explain how the case is-or at least ought to be
seen as-an example of the type of institutional specificity advocated by
Professor Schauer in his recent work on First Amendment institutions.'
In Lamont, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute
allowing the Postmaster General to regulate the flow of "communist
political propaganda" through the mails.2 ' The statute required the
Postmaster General to review all materials coming from abroad (though,
as a matter of practical implementation, only from certain foreign
countries) and, according to his discretion, determine which constituted
"communist political propaganda." ' 3  If the Postmaster General
determined that the mail was "communist political propaganda," the
addressee would receive a "reply" postcard instead of the materials.224
The addressee could return the card to the Post Office indicating a desire
to receive the materials, upon receipt of which the Post Office would
218. See U.S. ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Dem. Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407,437 (1921) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) ("[Tihe use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our
tongues .... "); supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
219. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen habit and law
combine to exclude every other [means of transportation] it seems to me that the First Amendment in
terms forbids such control of the post as was exercised here."); id. (noting that the theoretical
availability of othe-r means of circulation would not eliminate "the practical dependence of the public
upon the [Plostoffice").
220. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
221. See generally Schauer, Principles, supra note 9; Schauer, Towards, supra note 9; accord Paul
Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 563-88 (2005).
222. Lamont, 38r U.S. at 302-03.
223. Id. at 303.
224. Id.
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deliver the materials.22 If the addressee did nothing, the Post Office
would not deliver the materials.226 The statute exempted sealed letters,
materials sent pursuant to a subscription, and all mail sent to government
agencies and educational institutions.227 Under the postal regulations
implementing the statute, the reply card originally contained an area
where a patron could, in addition to asking for delivery of the specific
piece of mail, also request future delivery of all "similar publication[s].228
The Post Office would thus keep a list of those who requested
"communist political propaganda. ' '29 While the constitutional challenge
was pending in the Supreme Court, however, the Post Office changed the
regulations so that a list would no longer be kept.23° This meant that
addressees would need to return a reply card each time they were sent
"communist political propaganda" that they wanted to receive. 3'
After receiving a reply card, Corliss Lamont brought suit in the
Southern District of New York, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
statute as a violation of the First Amendment.23 '
The Court unanimously invalidated the statute.233 Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, reasoned that the statute violated the First
Amendment "because it require[d] an official act (viz., returning the
reply card) as a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's
First Amendment rights." '234 The Court concluded that the statute was
"almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as respects those
who have sensitive positions," and thus "amount[ed] to an
unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 302-03. A contemporary article describing the background to the statute's passage is
Meg Greenfield, How We Got Protected From Communist Propaganda, THE REPORTER, Oct. 25, 1962,
at 22-25. Two distinguished law professors, Murray Schwartz and James Paul, had been instrumental
in the 195os and early 196os in raising the First Amendment issues associated with postal censorship of
communist propaganda in the mails. See generally Murray L. Schwartz and James C.N. Paul, Foreign
Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, l07 U. PA. L.
REV. 621 (1959); Murray L. Schwartz, The Mail Must Not Go Through-Propaganda and
Pornography, i UCLA L. REV. 805, 805-45 (5964). The second of those two articles contains an
extremely detailed description of the legislative history of the statute, including the fact that the
"detention and release upon request" approach to communist propaganda taken by the statute was a
compromise between a bill that would have banned it from the mails altogether and one that would
have merely required warning signs about communist propaganda in post offices. See Schwartz, supra,
at 8o7-16. This middle-ground proposal, which eventually became law, was first proposed by Senator
Bush, the grandfather of the current President. See id. at 813-14. See generally DOROTHY GANFIELO
FOWLER, UNMAILABLE 153-57 (1977).




232. Id. at 304.
233. Id. at 305.
234. Id.
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rights." 35
Although the Court focused on what it referred to as the
"affirmative obligation" imposed on the addressee as a condition of
exercising his First Amendment rights, the Court, at one point early in its
analysis, alluded to the unique nature of the Post Office as a medium of
communication. But its institutional specificity was brief, nothing more
than a mere quotation from Justice Holmes's famous statement that,
"[t]he United States may give up the [P]ost [O]ffice when it sees fit, but
while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free
speech as the right to use our tongues. '236 Indeed, the Court went out of
its way to analogize Lamont to cases involving licensing and registration
requirements as a condition for the exercise of certain First Amendment
rights, cases that had nothing to do with the Post Office: "Just as the
licensing or taxing authorities in Lovell[ v. City of Griffin],237 Thomas[ v.
Collins]b and Murdock[ v. Pennsylvania]39 sought to control the flow of
ideas to the public, so here federal agencies regulate the flow of mail."24
The Court certainly attempted to articulate its holding in what it viewed
as "the narrow ground that the addressee ... must request in writing that
[his mail] be delivered,'' 4 but, on its face, the supposed "narrowness" of
the Court's decision in no way made the case a "post office" specific case.
In particular, the Court's opinion completely elided the significant
matter of the addressee's First Amendment "right to receive" materials.
Indeed, the Court's quotation from Justice Holmes ignored the fact that
the persons asserting First Amendment rights in the case were receiving,
rather than sending, materials through the mails. They were not seeking
to exercise their "right to use [their] tongues" at all, but instead were
claiming that the use of the mails was "as much a part of free speech as
the right to use our" eyes or ears, a rather different analytical
proposition. Be that as it may, Justice Brennan's concurrence tackled
that issue head on. '42 With broad language, Justice Brennan declared that
"the right to receive publications is... a fundamental right," the
protection of which is "necessary to make the express guarantees [of the
235. Id. at 307.
236. Id. at 305 (quoting U.S. ex reL Milwaukee Soc. Dem. Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437
(1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
237. 303 U.S. 444 0938).
238. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
239. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
240. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 306.
241. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
242. As Professor Currie has wryly put it, "Typically, Justice Douglas had not bothered to explain
the existence of [the First Amendment right of the addressee]. Typically, Justice Brennan had done so
in a concur[ence] .... " DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 524 (199o).
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First Amendment] fully meaningful."" 3  Given the Court's holding,
though, premised as it was on the recipient of the materials making the
constitutional claim rather than the foreign sender (to avoid what would
otherwise have been difficult questions of both third-party standing and
First Amendment protection for political propaganda from foreign
governments),2" it is clear that the entire Court was acknowledging a
"right to receive," a fact that was understood at the time. 45 In effect, the
Court held for the first time that the First Amendment encompassed a
right to receive, 46 one of the bedrock principles of the modern First
Amendment.
Besides this landmark doctrinal holding on the "right to receive,"
however, Lamont was remarkable in a number of other ways. Lamont
was the first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
statute under the Free Speech Clause.247 It is the first time that a Justice
ever used the phrase "marketplace of ideas."2" Corliss Lamont was
243. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
244. See id. at 307-08 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) and Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,781-85 (1950)).
245. See The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 103, 156 (1965) (referring to the
"Court's unanimous recognition of a right to receive publications" (emphasis added)).
246. Justice Brennan quoted language in Martin v. City of Struthers, but that language was clearly
dicta. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (quoting 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)). Struthers involved a Jehovah
Witness who challenged an ordinance that prohibited her from distributing literature by going door to
door. 319 U.S. at 142; see also William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right To Receive
Expression, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 303,307.
247. See FOWLER, supra note 227, at 159; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 315 (2ooo). It is worth further noting that Lamont was decided a year after what is perhaps the
most celebrated First Amendment case in American history, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
248. See HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 49 (1992); Vincent Blasi,
Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. I, 24, n. 8o. Of course, Lamont was not the
first time that a Justice expressed the theoretical notion underlying the phrase "marketplace of ideas."
Most famously, Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, wrote that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). But, as Professor Blasi has noted, "Holmes never
used the phrase 'marketplace of ideas.' That is a paraphrase supplied by his interpreters." Blasi, supra
at 24. Indeed, my sense is that the use of the "marketplace of ideas" phrase creates a subtle shift in our
thinking about the theoretical basis of the Abrams dissent from the truth-seeking rationale that
animated Holmes's "Victorian scientific positivism," in the context of a scientific enterprise, Thomas
C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 795 (1989), to a theory that
overemphasizes economic reasoning. Professor Coase's famous article on the First Amendment is
perhaps the embodiment of this shift. See R. H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The
Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974) (analogizing the "market
for ideas" to the "market for goods"); id. at 389 (arguing that there ought not be any "distinction
between the market for goods and the market for ideas" and that "we should use the same approach
for all markets when deciding on public policy"); see also Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (claiming that Holmes "discussed freedom of
speech in terms of a market in ideas"); Peter J. Hammer, Free Speech and the "Acid Bath": An
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himself a moderately remarkable figure, a Columbia philosophy
instructor and well known humanist.49 In addition, representing Lamont
was probably the most well-known-and certainly one of the finest-
constitutional lawyers in the country, Leonard Boudin" Boudin was the
brother-in-law of iconoclastic journalist I.F. "Izzy" Stone, and he had a
client list that reads like a mid-twentieth century list of leftist notables,
including Fidel Castro, Benjamin Spock, Daniel Ellsberg, Paul Robeson,
famed Cold War spy Judith Coplon,25 ' and more witnesses before the
House Un-American Affairs Committee than any other lawyer in the
country." '
In short, Lamont was an important case, both for its recognition of
what was in effect a new constitutional right and because the individuals
involved were so prominent at the time. But the case's holding cannot be
divorced from the institutional context of the Post Office. While the
Court might not have recognized it at the time, creating a "right to
receive" in abstract terms divorced from the institutional context of the
Post Office could create irresolvable tensions in doctrine. To see this,
consider how the Court attempted to deal with the "right to receive" in a
very different institutional context, the public school library. In doing so,
we see that Lamont is not just a case about "the right to receive"
materials, but is instead a case about the right to receive materials
through the unique government institution of the Post Office.253
Evaluation and Critique of Judge Richard Posner's Economic Interpretation of the First Amendment, 87
MICH. L. REV. 499, 499 (1988) (criticizing Posner's analysis, but like Posner, assuming that Holmes
invoked the "marketplace of ideas metaphor" and did so in economic terms). This is not to say that
economics cannot provide valuable insights into free speech theory, see Hammer, supra; Posner, supra,
nor is it to say that Justice Holmes did not see economics as an important aspect of his scientific
positivism. See, e.g., Blasi, supra at 5 (discussing Holmes's interest in economics and fascination with
Malthus). My point is simply that the use of the phrase creates a subtle distortion in the words Holmes
actually used, one that appears to give Holmes more of a neo-classical tint than he actually had. For an
extensive collection of materials on the Abrams dissent, see generally VINcETrr BLASI, IDEAS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 542-658 (2oo6).
249. See CORLIss LAMONT, YES TO LIFE: MEMOIRS OF CORLIss LAMONT 33-35 (I98I); Cf SUSAN
BRAUDY, FAMILY CIRCLE: THE BOUDINS AND THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LEFT 77 (2003). Lamont's
connection to the First Amendment succeeded his death. He endowed a chair at Columbia Law
School, currently occupied by renowned First Amendment scholar Vincent Blasi. See Columbia Law
School, Full Time Faculty, Vincent A. Blasi, http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/ (last visited Mar. s,
2007).
250. See generally Paul Wilkes, Leonard Boudin: The Left's Lawyer's Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Nov. 14, 197I, at 38.
251. In United States v. Coplon, the Second Circuit, deciding on statutory grounds, anticipated the
Supreme Court's important Fourth Amendment decision in United States v. Katz by almost twenty
years. 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 195o). As a result of Coplon, President Truman almost fired FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover. BRAUDY, supra note 249, at 66.
252. Wilkes, supra note 250, at 53.
253. See Lee, supra note 246, at 309 ("A likely limitation on the [contours of the right to receive]
comes from the fact that [Lamont] involved the postal system, a communications facility occupying a
special position in our society."); see also id. at 308 ("The unique context of Lamont, along with the
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In Board of Education v. Pico,254  the Court addressed a
constitutional challenge to a local school board's decision to remove
several books from a school library.255 In a splintered decision with seven
of the nine Justices writing opinions, the Court held that summary
judgment for the school board was inappropriate where there were
factual disputes about the school board's motivation for the removals 6
In the principal opinion, the important aspects of which only garnered
three votes, Justice Brennan relied on Lamont and other cases for the
"right to receive" principle for which Lamont is most often cited.257
Though Justice Brennan was able to cobble together a majority for the
remand, six Justices rejected his attempt to apply Lamont and the other
"right to receive" cases to the school library context." "s The other
opinions in the case suggest that institutional attributes, including the
institutional differences with the Post Office, played a role.
Consider the principal dissent, penned by Chief Justice Burger. On
the surface, the opinion unequivocally rejects both the "right to receive"
and institutional differences, but there are what Professor Schauer might
call "hints" of an institutional approach. 59 On the surface, Chief Justice
Burger shows little but disdain for the "right to receive" as conceived by
Justice Brennan, by denying that the right "carr[ies] with it the
concomitant right to have those ideas affirmatively provided at a
particular place by the government."2' The distinction is thus clear:
government cannot interfere with the "right to receive," but it has no
"obligation to aid a speaker or author in reaching an audience. ''2 6I
Otherwise, the "right to receive" would imply a right "to have public
libraries as part of a new constitutional 'right' to continuing adult
education. '' ,6, In other words, Burger viewed Pico as an easy case:
government officials get to decide what books they will provide because
by removing a book, "the government does not 'contract the spectrum of
available knowledge. ' '263
But, because Justice Brennan had limited his holding to decisions to
remove books from a school library rather than decisions to acquire
terseness of the majority opinion, suggest that the right protected is not readily transferable to other
settings.").
254. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
255. Id. at 855-56.
256. Id. at 875.
257. Id. at 867.
258. Id. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 883 (White, J., concurring); id. at 888 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (joined by Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ.).
259. See Schauer, Principles, supra note 9, at 120.
26o. Pico, 457 U.S. at 888 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 889 (quoting J. Brennan's opinion, id. at 866).
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books, the Chief Justice had another line of attack. This one focused on
the institutional attributes of the school. Although Pico, including
Burger's opinion, has been discussed extensively in the literature as it
relates to schools and libraries, 64 what interests me is the connection to
Lamont, a decision not even mentioned in Burger's opinion. Burger
included a section discussing "the unique environment of the local public
schools, '' 6S5 which began with the following statement: "Whatever role
the government might play as a conduit of information, schools in
particular ought not be made a slavish courier of the material of third
parties."' Notice the reference to schools as a possible "conduit" of
information and as a "courier," the assumption being that Justice
Brennan's opinion would result in treating schools as such a courier.
Chief Justice Burger's earlier broad argument, denying a governmental
"obligation" to facilitate a particular author's speech, clearly ignored
Lamont's holding that, if the government continues to provide postal
service, it must distribute materials through that network evenhandedly.
To put the holding of Lamont in Chief Justice Burger's words from Pico,
we might say that Lamont held that the government, through its Post
Office, must be "a slavish courier of the material of third parties."
Implicit in Chief Justice Burger's discussion of public schools, then, is an
institutional understanding that a school is not a post office because it is
not a "courier." None of this should be too surprising, since it is of course
true that a school is not a post office. Chief Justice Burger's opinion
implicitly recognized this crucial real-world difference in the
governmental role. In this sense, the "right to receive" depends on
unique attributes of the Post Office.
Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's dissent is even more explicit
about the importance of understanding the unique characteristics of the
school and the school library, though it contains an interesting twist. The
principal point of Justice Rehnquist's opinion is that "government may
act in other capacities than as sovereign, and when it does the First
Amendment may speak with a different voice."'6' Justice Rehnquist not
only strikes the legal realist pose but also foreshadows Schauer's
264. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the 'Pall of Orthodoxy': Value
Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 52-77; Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection
and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 541-53 (1984). One
interesting article on Pico argues that Justice Blackmun's concurrence exemplifies the view that
"where libraries are concerned, what the Constitution must protect is not some naked exercise of
individualism, but rather a complex relationship among (at a minimum) the reader, the librarian, other
patrons, the institution the library serves, and perhaps even the books themselves." Mark C. Rahdert,
Preserving the Archives of Freedom: Justice Blackmun and First Amendment Protections for Libraries,
97 DicK. L. REv. 437, 441 (1993).
265. Pico, 457 U.S. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 889.
267. Id. at 9o8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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institutional First Amendment. After rejecting a right to receive in the
context of a public school, Justice Rehnquist stated, "the Court will far
better serve the cause of First Amendment jurisprudence by candidly
recognizing that the role of government as sovereign is subject to more
stringent limitations than is the role of government as employer,
property owner, or educator. '26 Justice Rehnquist did not say that we
should have, as Professor Schauer has suggested "(somewhat) separate
bodies of free speech law for libraries, for schools, for elections, for
broadcasting, for the fine arts, and so on. ' 2'6 But, there is little question
that characterizing the case as one about the public school-a particular
government institution with specific characteristics -rather than an
abstract government activity helped Justice Rehnquist's argument.70
For the purposes of understanding Lamont and the Court's
institutional characterization of the Post Office, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion also provides help. He criticized Justice Brennan's reliance on
precedents for a right to receive by stating that "every one of [the cases
relied on by Justice Brennan] concerned the complete denial of access to
the ideas sought. 27' Among these cases was Lamont. So, Justice
268. Id. at 920; see also id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing to Justice Rehnquist's opinion
while noting that "the government is acting in its special role as educator"). But cf Yudof, supra note
264, at 545 ("The 'right to know,' as articulated by the Supreme Court, is no more than artistic
camouflage to protect the interest of the willing speaker who seeks to communicate with a willing
listener.").
269. Schauer, Principles, supra note 9, at I 19. Recall also that Justice Rehnquist clerked for Justice
Jackson, who famously said that "[t]he moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill,
the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each,
in my view, is a law unto itself." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
270. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 919 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The inconsistencies and illogic [of
Justice Brennan's view] are emphasized because they illustrate that the right [to receive] is misplaced
in the elementary and secondary school setting."); see also id. at 914-15 (criticizing Justice Brennan's
use of cases involving public libraries and noting further "that the First Amendment right to receive
information simply has no application to the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a place
for the selective conveyance of ideas").
In his first term on the Court, Justice Rehnquist did very much the same thing, concurring in a
case involving a state college's denial of official recognition to a student group: "[Tihe constitutional
limitations on the government's acting as administrator of a college differ from the limitations on the
government's acting as sovereign to enforce its criminal laws." Healy v. James, 4o8 U.S. I69, 201
(I972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Richard W. Garnett, Less is More: Justice Rehnquist, the
Freedom of Speech, and Democracy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 26, 29 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.comiso13/papers.cfm?abstract id=715564 (noting the importance in
Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence in "appreciat[ing] that governments act in all kinds of ways and in a
variety of capacities"); William H. Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the
Law, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1976) (categorizing First Amendment cases so as to distinguish those
in which government acts as "proprietor"); cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State., 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1321-23 (1984) (analyzing some of the
rationales underlying Justice Rehnquist's proprietary/sovereign distinction and suggesting that the
distinction is "tenuous[ ]").
271. Pico, 457 U.S. at 913 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Rehnquist implicitly understood prohibitions on postal distribution as
the functional equivalent of a "complete denial of access to the ideas
sought."
Now, one should not overstate this. Surely, there is a little advocacy
here. People can get foreign communist propaganda by traveling. While
some countries are-at least as a matter of law-off limits (e.g. Cuba,
North Korea) ,27' a citizen who traveled to Canada or Western Europe
could easily get such materials. Moreover, if the material is brought into
the country, it could be distributed via private delivery services. 73 Finally,
and perhaps most simply, the law at issue in Lamont had huge
exceptions, including for U.S. government officials, public libraries,
universities, and other institutions "for advanced studies." '274 Another
exception was for first-class mail. If the material was sealed in an
envelope, it could be sent. So, literally, Justice Rehnquist was wrong.
Nonetheless, the basic point remains. In this, Justice Rehnquist
certainly was correct. A restriction on postal distribution is far more like
a "complete denial" than is the lack of a book in a school library's
collection. The reason for this, though unarticulated by Justice
Rehnquist, is obvious: the Post Office is not a school library. If courts
recognize this distinction, then First Amendment jurisprudence will more
accurately further the values underlying freedom of expression. As
simple as this point might seem, this is exactly my argument: the
American Post Office is a particular type of governmental institution.
Specifically, it is a conduit that the Lamont Court understood to be a
"monopoly" in some abstract sense notwithstanding the fact that the
legal monopoly provisions were not at issue. Moreover, as Justice
Rehnquist later concluded, the Post Office demanded a neutrality that
was unwise in the context of a public school library. In this sense, as
Justice Rehnquist rightly implied in Pico, the institution of the American
Post Office is very different from a school library.275
272. Cf Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding government's ability to deny U.S. citizens the
right to travel to Cuba).
273. These materials were not "letters" and thus not subject to the postal monopoly.
274. 39 U.S.C. § 4oo8(c), repealed by Postal Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 719 (ig7o). As a
peripheral point, this exception included any "official" at a university and thus it seems likely that
Corliss Lamont could have received a copy of the Peking Review at his Columbia University office
without completing a reply card. Given that fact, one might wonder whether Lamont would lack
standing under current doctrine if the law had been challenged today.
275. 1 do not argue that school libraries-or indeed even public libraries in general-do not have a
place in our understanding of the First Amendment. As Benjamin Franklin understood two and a half
centuries ago, the library as an institution is important in furthering some of the goals we associate
with the First Amendment, and the courts have certainly recognized that fact. The library's role in the
First Amendment constellation is, however, different from that of the Post Office, and it is these
differences that help explain the different treatment the library has received in the Court's
interpretations of the Constitution. Cf. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4, 78-80 (2003) (describing American Library Ass'n v.
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This neutrality was not natural, even if it feels that way now (and,
indeed, probably did to the Court when it decided Lamont in 1965). It
was created, as I explained in Part I, by early American lawmakers. The
institutional attribute of neutrality was incorporated into the legal and
social fabric of the Post Office in the eighteenth century by changing the
Post Office from a governmental mouthpiece, as it had been in England,
to a conduit for the delivery of materials from all sources equally. In the
twentieth century, this neutrality combined with the fact that the Post
Office was a monopoly to help the Court establish the landmark
principle of the "right to receive ideas."
CONCLUSION
We are naturally familiar with the process by which the
Constitution's drafters or the courts shape the meaning of the
Constitution. What we often forget are the ways in which other
institutions give meaning to the Constitution, even unbeknownst to those
who create and maintain those institutions. The Post Office shaped the
First Amendment: it gave us First Amendment restrictions on
government spending and the right to receive ideas. But it wasn't just the
Post Office as an abstract medium of communication. Rather, it was the
specific American Post Office birthed during the Revolutionary Era and
defined by policymakers who gave it particular attributes: a neutral
conduit with subsidies for news, along with a legal and practical
monopoly over long-distance communication. Those policymakers likely
understood at some level the importance of their choices as a matter of
communications policy, but it seems just as likely that they did not
realize the impact their choices were going to have on First Amendment
jurisprudence in the twentieth century. But, without those postal policy
choices, the First Amendment might look different today. As we look to
the First Amendment of tomorrow, then, today's policy debates-about,
for example, "net neutrality"-might have far more impact on the future
First Amendment than any current debate about the direction of First
Amendment doctrine, because it is the underlying assumptions that are
built into the communications infrastructure that will likely shape future
judges' perception of the meaning of the First Amendment.
United States, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), as a case about "the social meaning of libraries").
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